

# **The Majdan vs. Utilitarianism: Reflecting on Emerging Moral Patterns in Ukraine<sup>1</sup>**

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2<sup>nd</sup> Annual Conference of the Institute of Ecumenical Studies, UCU  
Lviv, Ukraine, June 1-4, 2006

For me it is a great honor and pleasure to be invited and to participate in the Second Annual Conference of the Institute of Ecumenical Studies entitled *Radical Orthodoxy: A Christian Answer to Post-Modern Culture*. I am profoundly grateful for the invitation to contribute to this discussion centered on very important issues of post-modern culture. I sincerely wish the most fruitful and open dialog to all participants of the conference.

## **Two Moral Patterns and Democracy**

In my presentation today I would like to offer to you my thoughts and reflections about some emerging moral patterns in Ukraine. I will limit myself just to two moral patterns, namely, to what is traditionally referred to as utilitarian morality and, hopefully, to a different kind of morality which so many Ukrainians have experienced, manifested, and relived from within during the Orange Revolution in 2004.

Let me begin by quoting the words of John Paul II from *Evangelium vitae* about the existing relationship between democracy and morality. He writes:

Democracy cannot be idolized to the point of making it a substitute for morality or a panacea for immorality. Fundamentally, democracy is a "system" and as such is a means and not an end. Its "moral" value is not automatic, but depends on conformity to the moral law to which it, like every other form of human behaviour, must be subject...<sup>2</sup>

The idea that the process of building democracy presupposes certain moral frameworks and that the value of democracy itself depends on conformity to the moral law is of crucial importance for the present reflection.

The Ukrainian nation in its most recent history has clearly demonstrated some fundamental level of self-consciousness and maturity. Ukrainians are actively exploring various dimensions of their country's independence, as well as of their individual freedom. Sometimes these explorations lead them towards wonderful results, and sometimes they turn out to be very painful and devastating. Among the dimensions explored, the moral one is all the more often coming to the public concern.

At the very outset I should mention that I will omit from my consideration one of the patterns of moral behavior which results from the various types of relativism. Such an omission is not because moral relativism plays a very minor and insignificant role in the Ukrainian context. It would be worthwhile to analyze the roots and consequences of the increasing relativization of morality and culture on its own. I am convinced that the spirit and morality of the Majdan was clearly opposed to any form of moral indifference or relativism, demanding some fundamental level of respect for human freedom and dignity. In my opinion the kind of opposition between the two moral worldviews, namely moral relativism and the Majdan's morality, has already received some philosophical and theological reflection. I suggest paying more attention to what I consider to be a more subtle and less analyzed distinction between the moral principles manifested during the orange events in Ukraine and the kind of morality exemplified in utilitarian civilization.

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<sup>1</sup> The Majdan, is, our course, the public square, and, in the current context, the square in mind is Independence Square in Kyiv, where the Orange Revolution occurred in 2004.

<sup>2</sup> *Evangelium vitae*, #70.

Additionally, my specific focus of this presentation was inspired by and is due to the recent parliamentary elections in Ukraine, wherein no political party and no politician were openly and publicly professing any form of relativism. Practically all of them were extremely confident as to what the common good is and what would serve the interest of all Ukrainian people best. It was openly declared that their main reason to participate in the elections was the maximization of the well-being of an increasing number of Ukrainian citizens.

While listening to various campaign speeches, debates and rhetoric, I wondered whether there is at least some chance that publicly declared concern for the common good will remain a powerful motive after the elections are over. Secondly, I was wondering to what extent utilitarian concepts and philosophy have penetrated the minds of those who, I hope, were at least to some extent sincere in their concern for the common good. However, my ultimate question was whether the moral principles and stance manifested by millions of Ukrainians during the Orange Revolution in the fall of 2004 have any resemblance to the utilitarian worldview and morality. The millions of protesters were clearly hoping for a better life, and they were clearly hoping for a better life for many of their fellow men. Thus, one may be tempted to promptly conclude that there was a great deal of utilitarianism present in their thinking and acting.

Before I answer this question, I suggest first to look critically at the concept of utilitarianism and ask ourselves whether there is something potentially dangerous or even inimical to human persons in living their lives according to utilitarian morality. This, I believe, will help us to draw a clear cut line between the two mentioned moral patterns.

## **Utilitarianism and the Experience of Depersonalization**

So, our current working hypothesis tells us that utilitarianism has the potential to become a powerful and wide-spread moral pattern in Ukraine. By using the term “utilitarianism,” I thereby refer to a theory which teaches that what is good for the totality of individuals is the standard of morality. In other words, utilitarianism is about what it means to live rightly. Such an emphasis on the righteousness of an action is due to the specific assumption that everyone’s living right should serve the maximization of the total welfare and happiness.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, it is also assumed that the total welfare in the final analysis determines the rules of living right. Utilitarian morality in virtue of its preoccupation with the total well-being is very keen on the good outcomes of the morally good acting.<sup>4</sup>

Thomas Nagel analyzes utilitarianism in his book *The View From Nowhere* wherein he questions all – as he calls them – impersonal moralities from the viewpoint of these theories being able to promote and foster the good life of an agent as compared with the life being lived right. The term “impersonal,” in the way Nagel uses it, implies that the norms of a given impersonal morality have universal validity and therefore are not derived from any particular personal perspective. Therefore, if someone complies with the demands of an impersonal morality, he definitely acts in a morally right way. However, to what extent his life thereby becomes more good remains, as Nagel thinks, an open question.<sup>5</sup> Due to the limits of this

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<sup>3</sup> One of the most famous contemporary proponents of the ethics of utilitarianism is Professor Peter Singer of the University Center for Human Values at Princeton University. See Peter Singer, *Practical Ethics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

<sup>4</sup> For Mill the resulting happiness of man is what gives an act moral goodness. Ethics is primarily concerned with results, thus he writes: “the creed which accepts as the foundation of morals *utility*, or *the greatest happiness principle*, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.” Mill, S. *Utilitarianism, Collected Works*, Vol. 10 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), ch. 2.

<sup>5</sup> See: Thomas Nagel’s Chapter X in his *The View From Nowhere*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); hereafter cited as: *The View From Nowhere*.

presentation I will not be able to elaborate more with respect to the distinction between living right and living the good life. However, if I were to define the good life as the life which preserves the integrity and wholeness of the human person, has no depersonalizing character with respect to man, and fosters one's specifically personal fulfillment, then Nagel's question suggests a very interesting way of analyzing the impact of utilitarian morality on the person.

In his *Sources of the Self*, Charles Taylor aptly characterizes utilitarianism as a theory which overemphasizes the practical outcomes of man's acting to the extent that *some properly personal attitudes and experiences are either ignored or even declared to be immoral*. "Our scientific effort," writes Taylor, "should not serve simply to create objects of contemplation for us, but should serve to 'relieve the condition of mankind.' Practical charity is enjoined on us. (...) it has become one of the central beliefs of modern Western culture: we all should work to improve the human condition, relieve suffering, overcome poverty, increase prosperity, augment human welfare. We should strive to leave the world a more prosperous place than we found it."<sup>6</sup> It is assumed then that it is possible to deduce certain rules or principles of human conduct which, being followed by everyone, will lead us towards a more prosperous society. These principles and rules which tell us what we ought to do are declared to have a moral character. What stands behind this declaration is the conviction that morality thus conceived should serve as a *means* for promoting "practical benevolence" and increasing the prosperity of our society.

Secondly, utilitarian moral theory could be seen as an attempt to approach one's acting from a standpoint which excludes all personal aspects of and perspectives on a given particular situation. In other words, the moral acting of an agent is supposed to be seen from a totally disengaged and detached standpoint which, as it is thought, should guarantee the objectivity and universality of moral norms. As Thomas Nagel in his *The View From Nowhere* comments: "Initially this may seem to produce the result that the welfare and the projects of others should be accorded as much weight as my own and those of people I care about: that I should be as impartial between myself and others as I would be between people I don't know."<sup>7</sup> Such attempts to build a moral theory upon the *impersonal* principles and motives leads one to a conclusion that, objectively speaking, *no one is more important than anyone else*. This in turn, seems to imply that my personal standpoint and concerns should not take a priority over the concerns of other fellow people in any situation which has moral significance.

A kind of "egoistic movement" in one's soul occurs, according to utilitarianism, already at the point when one begins to ask himself what is *valuable* in the world that surrounds him and what is worthy of being *loved* and *admired*, and what demands his sacrifice. Such a man is considered to be taking care solely of his own soul and neglects the maximization of the total well-being. In this regard Charles Taylor emphasizes the utilitarian's exclusive preoccupation with action and its good results as being a sign of moral commitment. Thus, he writes:

This can seem to give independent justification to the exclusive focus on action in much of contemporary moral theory. This focus can be represented as being a sign of moral earnestness, of benevolent determination. Those who are concerned about what is valuable, what one should love or admire, are worried about the state of their own souls. They are self-absorbed, prone to narcissism, and not committed to altruistic action, the improvement of the lot of mankind, or the defense of justice. Utilitarians frequently slide into moral arguments in defense of their ethical theory.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Taylor, C. *Sources of the Self* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 85; hereafter cited as: *Sources of the Self*.

<sup>7</sup> *The View from Nowhere*, p. 201.

<sup>8</sup> *Sources of the Self*, p. 85.

If this were true, it would obviously lead us to the conclusion that *in order not to be egoistic and selfish one has to think of oneself as an instrument for augmenting the total welfare.*

At this point I would like to emphasize that I am not arguing that if utilitarianism and the moral theory accompanying it would be accepted by the majority of the Ukrainian people it would lead us to any dramatic decrease in the quality of life. It would probably be the case that the human condition would be improved and the level of poverty would be less dramatic, at least during some initial stage. However important these quality factors of human life and condition might be, they, in my understanding, do not outweigh the questions of the inner character of the lives led along the lines of utilitarianism.

There is a certain paradox associated with utilitarianism which consists in the fact that at first sight it seems to estimate so highly human freedom, altruism, and justice, but given a closer analysis these goods remain essentially unfulfilled and even denied. The reason why utilitarianism under closer scrutiny reveals its self-contradictory character comes to the fore if we take into account that at its heart stands what Taylor calls a procedural conception of ethics. Taylor uses the term “procedural” in order to indicate that the truth of a certain statement (its being right) is derived not from its correspondence to a certain order of being, but rather is seen as a consequence of a specific mode of reasoning. He argues that in all theories of obligatory action such as utilitarianism, the vision of what is good and what is bad as inherent in the transcendent order of being does not play any crucial role for establishing moral norms and obligations. This is why he writes that “the excellence of practical reasoning is defined in terms of a certain style, method, or procedure of thought. For the utilitarians, rationality is maximizing calculations. Zweckrationalität is the crucial form. For the Kantians, the definitive procedure of practical reason is that of universalization.”<sup>9</sup> Given the fact that the ought-to-be component of a norm is not a matter of discovering a transcendent order of being, the only way to preserve the valuable character of moral acting and seemingly to safeguard human freedom is to look for the justifications of moral norms in procedural terms and rational calculations.

It might be of interest to mention that Nietzsche has also criticized utilitarianism in his own special way. Nietzsche often has utilitarianism in mind when he pours his scorn over Christian morality. If it were the case that Christian morality in its essence is modeled around utilitarian principles, it would be completely devastated by Nietzsche’s critique. He has a very keen grasp of the core features of utilitarianism and its self-contradictory character.<sup>10</sup> Nietzsche’s claim and insistence on the utilitarian roots of Christian morality does not hold true. However, for the sake of the present conversation let us pay attention to his critique of utilitarianism.

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 86.

<sup>10</sup> In Nietzsche’s own words: “The praise of the selfless, the self-sacrificial, the virtuous – that is, of those who do not apply their whole strength and reason to their own preservation, development, evaluation, promotion, and the expansion of their power, but rather live, in relation to themselves, modestly and thoughtlessly, perhaps even with indifference or irony – this praise certainly was not born from the spirit of selflessness. The ‘neighbor’ praises selflessness *because it brings him advantages*. If the neighbor himself were ‘selfless’ in this thinking, he would repudiate this diminution of strength, this mutilation for *his* benefit; he would work against the development of such inclinations, and above all he would manifest his selflessness by *not* calling it *good!* This indicates the fundamental contradiction in the morality that is very prestigious nowadays: the *motives* of this morality stand opposed to its *principle*. What this morality considers its proof is refuted by its criterion of what is moral. In order not to contravene its own morality, the demand ‘You shall renounce yourself and sacrifice yourself’ could be laid down only by those who thus renounced their own advantage and perhaps brought about their own destruction through the demanded sacrifice of individuals. But as soon as the neighbor (or society) recommends altruism *for the sake of its utility*, it applies the contradictory principle. ‘You shall seek your advantage even at the expense of everything else’ – and thus one preaches, in the same breath, a ‘Thou shalt’ and ‘Thou shalt not’.” Nietzsche, F. *The Gay Science*, trans. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), #21.

The main problem of traditional morality, as Nietzsche understands it, lies in the fact that morality's motive or ground for its existence stands in radical opposition to its main principle. Thereby he implies that morality comes to exist because its proponents consider the way of acting and living it endorses as being effectively useful for the community welfare. At the same time, the main principle which is supposed to underlie man's moral acting is serving the other, that is, giving up one's energy, health, and life to the fellow man for the sake of this fellow man. In other words, from the moral view point, as Nietzsche claims, I endorse your self-sacrificing action for my own sake or for the sake of the rest. Thus, given that the ultimate meaning of morality consists in its being useful, it teaches its followers two contradictory things at the same time. One claim would be, "you ought to sacrifice yourself for the sake of the other" and the second one would demand that "you ought to seek your own happiness even at the cost of the others." In other words, the role played by moral virtue, as it is traditionally conceived, consists in transforming an individual into an instrument being used by the totality.

Nietzsche's critique of utilitarianism suggests that someone who seriously adheres to utilitarian philosophy is acting in a somewhat egoistic way. And his desire to help has a very specific character if we realize that deep down the consciousness of such a man remains formed along the lines of very selfish motives. This implies that the desire to be helpful to the other comes about not as being born in the love directed to the other person, but rather, as a consequence of the principle which dictates "loving" sickness and poverty. The situation is completely different in the case of a truly good man who "does not love sickness and poverty, but what is behind them, and his help is directed against these evils."<sup>11</sup>

Scheler further develops this thought by saying that a good man "does not help this struggling life because of those negative values, but despite them – he helps in order to develop whatever may still be sound and positive."<sup>12</sup> In the case of morality originating from a purely utilitarian perspective it may well be the case that "nobody is seen behind" sickness and poverty; specifically personal values and dignity do not come to the fore and thus, there remains only the desire to make life as such more bearable and less painful.

Thus, we see that this seemingly "healthy," sound and open personality which emerges in the process of the evolution of utilitarian mentality reveals itself as being profoundly damaged. Paradoxically, the sort of "equilibrium" and "inner peace" man has achieved in this way appears to be very aggressive with respect to his inner life. Man begins to experience himself as being unable to live his interiority from within and as being driven into the external world; he attempts to escape from himself. The inner drama which is taking place in this situation is well captured by Max Scheler in the following passage wherein he depicts one way of "serving" the other man which stands in radical contrast to the Christian idea of love and mercy:

But there is a completely different way of stooping to the small, the lowly, and the common, even though it may seem almost the same. Here love does not spring from an abundance of vital power, from firmness and security. Here it is only a euphemism for escape, for the inability to "remain at home" with oneself (*chez soi*). Turning toward others is but a secondary consequence of this urge to flee from oneself. (...) Afraid of seeing itself and its interiority, it is driven to give itself to the other – not because of his worth, but merely for the sake of his "otherness." Modern philosophical jargon has found a revealing term for this phenomenon, one of the many modern substitutes for love: "altruism". This love is not directed at a previously discovered positive value, nor does any such value flash up in the act of loving: there is nothing but the urge to turn

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<sup>11</sup> Scheler, M. *Ressentiment*, ed. by Lewis A. Coser, trans. by William W. Holdnem, (New York: The Free Press, 1961), p. 91.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

away from oneself and to lose oneself in other people's business.<sup>13</sup>

This paragraph provides us with a key for understanding the utilitarian mentality with its constant preoccupation with doing useful things and promoting total welfare. It is no surprise that within this morality the life of an individual becomes increasingly pointless and senseless if it decreases his or her capacity for being useful in society. What is externally treated to be an expression of love and compassion to human beings in its internal dimension, as Scheler argues, is nothing else but the inability to "remain at home" with oneself. Working hard and trying to be useful to others seems to be exactly what satisfies this kind of inner being driven out of one's interiority and it also seems to serve the best interest of the society.

There is another paragraph in which Scheler mentions that one of the effects of the utilitarian way of living is the "diminished capacity for enjoyment." This fact well serves as an example which points to the fact how great is a deprivation on the level of men's affective experiences if they turn away their sight from objective values. Utilitarianism, which pronounces total happiness as its goal, appears to contradict itself already on the level of the most elementary human experiences: "men's minds become increasingly joyless. Extremely merry things, viewed by extremely sad people who do not know what to do with them: that is the 'meaning' of our metropolitan 'culture' of entertainment."<sup>14</sup>

By way of summarizing my reflections I would like to say that in the case of the utilitarian way of acting we observe something which from the external point of view resembles very much the phenomenon of personal transcendence but which under closer analysis reveals its totally different character. The moment of transcendence is lacking in the utilitarian attitude for the reason that the value dimension of reality, and especially the morally relevant values, are not seen and not recognized. Moreover, the mode of being driven outside of one's interiority with the intention of losing oneself in external things and in "other people's business" not only dramatically reduces man's capacity to see what is good-in-itself but it also prompts him to avoid such value-experiences for the reason that they have power to "bring him home" to himself. If, in spite of all, such an encounter with a value takes place, it inevitably creates an inner tension in man for the reason of awakening and making more vivid the experience of being *instrumentalized*, which otherwise often seems to be absent in the conscious experiences of one who lives according to utilitarian principles.

Utilitarian morality clearly points to the fact that someone who lives within its framework and acts in a way which promotes the well-being of others still in the depths of his subjectivity is self-given as being instrumentalized and, thus, experiences himself as not being free in the most proper sense. Utilitarianism completely overlooks *the phenomenon of moral transcendence rooted in the value-responding attitude* of the person. Scheler has in mind exactly this moment of personal moral transcendence when he comments on the parable about the rich young man who was told to divest himself of all his riches and give them to the poor. He forcefully emphasizes that this order is given

not in order to help the "poor" and to affect a better distribution of property in the interest of the general welfare. Nor it is because poverty as such is supposed to be better than wealth. The order is given because the *act* of giving away, and the spiritual freedom and abundance of love which manifest themselves in this act, ennoble the youth and make him even "richer" than he is.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 95.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 154.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 93.

It is precisely in and through moral transcendence that the young man could become “richer” than he is. The new richness is born by the “act of giving away” which manifests man’s love and mercy directed towards the poor. There is obviously nothing wrong in the desire to help the poor and make the distribution of the general welfare more just. However, this noble desire could lead one into the utilitarian world if it becomes a substitute for the acts of love and mercy. It is this inner “becoming richer” which convincingly shows morality’s congenial and beneficial character with respect to man. Nagel was perfectly right in asking whether in a utilitarian civilization acting in a morally right way always benefits the agent himself. To the extent that the transcendent order of value and meanings eludes the sight of the person, he experiences his freedom as being dramatically paralyzed by the instrumentalizing desire to augment the general welfare. This is so because, as Scheler says, the “important thing is not the amount of welfare, it is that there should be a *maximum of love* among men.”<sup>16</sup> In the words of John Paul II, utilitarianism is but one of the signs of the eclipse of the sense of God and of man which inevitably leads one towards the abandonment of the truly interpersonal, spiritual, moral, and religious dimensions of personal existence.<sup>17</sup>

## **Majdan Community**

To refresh in our minds the events which took place in Ukraine in the late fall of 2004 I would like to cite a brief quote from an article in a Western newspaper:

Over the next 17 days, through harsh cold and sleet, millions of Ukrainians staged nationwide nonviolent protests that came to be known as the "orange revolution." The entire world watched, riveted by this outpouring of the people's will in a country whose international image had been warped by its corrupt rulers. By the time victory was announced – in the form of opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko's electoral triumph – the orange revolution had set a major new landmark in the postcommunist history of eastern Europe, a seismic shift Westward in the geopolitics of the region. Ukraine's revolution was just the latest in a series of victories for "people power" – in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia in the late 1980s and, more recently, in Serbia and Georgia.<sup>18</sup>

The event which Karatnycky describes as a geopolitical seismic shift was in fact a major event and transformation in the spiritual history of the Ukrainian people. The geopolitical shift was just an expression and result of a profound and mature exercise of freedom by millions of Ukrainian citizens. The Majdan has clearly manifested a new kind of ethos with its own moral stance and moral pattern.

For those who relived the atmosphere of the Majdan and spend a few days in the midst of Independence Square surrounded by hundreds of thousands protesters it was absolutely clear that it was not the amount of the total welfare that made them join the revolution. Yes, it is true that the election fraud was the major reason why millions of people protested. It is also true that the massive falsification appeared to be an outrageous climax to the growing corruption which became unbearable for many in this country. Many people perceived the attempt to

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 96.

<sup>17</sup> John Paul II writes: “The eclipse of the sense of God and of man inevitably leads to a practical materialism, which breeds individualism, utilitarianism and hedonism. Here too we see the permanent validity of the words of the Apostle: "And since they did not see fit to acknowledge God, God gave them up to a base mind and to improper conduct" (Rom 1:28). The values of being are replaced by those of having. The only goal which counts is the pursuit of one's own material well-being. The so-called "quality of life" is interpreted primarily or exclusively as economic efficiency, inordinate consumerism, physical beauty and pleasure, to the neglect of the more profound dimensions-interpersonal, spiritual and religious-of existence.” *Evangelium vitae*, #21.

<sup>18</sup> Karatnycky A. “Ukraine's Orange Revolution”, in *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2005.

hijack Ukraine's presidency as a very brutal violation of their freedom and of their choice. All this remains very true.

However, there was something very special and unique about the Majdan atmosphere. This uniqueness is due to the fact that from the very first moments of the public protests the Majdan turned out to be not merely a physical place in the middle of the Ukrainian capital but it was immediately transformed into a very special community of people welcoming warmly and open-heartedly every new man or woman who decided to join the orange events. For many their first both surprising and uplifting encounter with the living and vividly-experienced love of the Majdan community will be remembered forever.

My own analysis of the Majdan leads me to a somewhat paradoxical conclusion. While the real cause which triggered the protest of millions was dissatisfaction with their country's corrupted leadership, yet the people's response to the massive falsifications was, at the first sight at least, difficult to understand and even to justify. The most important thing for all of them was to take care of their fellow protesters. It is even more amazing since no one was discriminating between his or her friends and the people he or she never knew before. It almost looked like everyone was so much engulfed and overwhelmed serving others that the revolution was taking place on its own and was moving forward on its own track. And still, it would be completely wrong to think of these people as somehow losing sight of the big picture or forgetting what they struggled for. They definitely knew what kind of change they were demanding? And yet, it seemed that to build the Majdan community and solidarity was the ultimate, the most important, and the most rewarding goal.

The abundance of love manifested in the multiple acts of sacrifice has made everyone richer. Scheler was perfectly right in saying that for a civilization based on personalist principles it is not the amount of total welfare which is the main objective and motive but rather "the *maximum of love* among men" which matters most of all. One of the most amazing features of Majdan spirituality was its power to profoundly integrate the personality of every member of the Majdan community. People were able to recover their truly personal capacity for self-possession and transcendence. The peaceful atmosphere of the many days of the protest, along with everyone's confidence in being called to pursue his protest to the end, were due to a sincere grasp of the fundamental values.

The orange revolution has created a unique context in which the true sense of man was discovered by many people. The Majdan has firmly confirmed and revealed the truth of John Paul's claim that man's "greatness, and therefore his vocation, consists in the sincere gift of self."<sup>19</sup> The true sense, nature, and dignity of man profoundly experienced open the hearts of many people towards the rediscovery of the true sense of God as well.

To summarize, Ukrainian young democracy will be facing many challenges in the future and among those challenges the most serious one will be of a moral and spiritual nature. In this regard the main contribution of the orange revolution consists in establishing a certain moral climate in Ukraine. John Paul II in *Evangelium vitae* writes that "the value of democracy stands or falls with the values which it embodies and promotes".<sup>20</sup> Hopefully, the moral pattern and spirituality manifested in the course of the orange revolution and respect for values such as the dignity of every human person along with respect for human rights will become constitutive elements of the culture of life in Ukraine.

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<sup>19</sup> *Evangelium vitae*, #25.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, #70.