

Between Objectivity and Politics: Debating the Public Use of History in Contemporary Ukraine

Volodymyr Sklokin

Ukrainian historiography over the last twenty years provides an interesting case study for understanding the “nationalization” of the past by professional historians, on the one hand, and the criticism of such “nationalization” and the elaboration of alternative approaches—particularly *transnational history*—on the other. From this perspective, the Ukrainian case can be used for a comparative study of phenomena such as the instrumentalization of history, the affirmative role of history in national identity and collective memory, and the interplay of politics, historiography, and mass consciousness.

In this article, I will combine this already developed perspective of studying Ukrainian and other post-Soviet historiographies with an analysis of the way in which proponents and opponents of the national paradigm answer the question of the practical role of history in contemporary society. This change of perspective requires a contextualization of the Ukrainian case not only within international debates on national history and its limitations, but also within debates related to the use and abuse of history, historical objectivity and historians’ duties, responsibilities and values in post-war Western historiography.

There exists no study devoted to this problem in Ukrainian historiography, and the few scholars who touched on some aspects of the topic used the language of the participants themselves to describe it, which negatively affected their conceptual frameworks. My point here is that the study of this question will contribute to a better understanding of the Ukrainian discussion on the interpretation of national history and the impasse in which it appears to have found itself—and will perhaps help find a way out.

In order to achieve this, at first I briefly review the debate between the proponents and opponents of the national paradigm from the perspective of the social relevance of history. I will argue that historians from both camps tend to advocate reductionist views on the role of history in contemporary society, reducing it either to an affirmation of national identity and serving immediate political needs or to a deconstruction of myths and stereotypes. Then I will try to broaden the context of the discussion by showing that Ukrainian problems with the national paradigm are only a regional variation of some global phenomenon related to the paradigmatic change that took place in the Western history-writing in the last decades of the twentieth century. I will conclude with the examination of some alternative approaches that try to avoid this

reductionism and draw attention to positive practical functions of history writing while upholding the core principles of historical inquiry.

If one wants to examine the debates on the social relevance of history in the independent Ukraine, one should remember that during the Soviet era, history had been treated as an important part of the state ideology. The academic historians were obliged to serve the interests of the state supplying the evidences of historical inevitability of the Soviet regime and proving the progressive character of its ideology. The historian was often seen then as “the fighter on the ideological front” and propagandist whose mission was to defend some dogmatic truth and to convince others of its truthfulness. For those who believed in the communist ideology, this role gave a feeling of “high social mission” and indisputable societal importance of one’s work. For those academics who did not believe in it, the only way to avoid at least partly the performing of this role was to deal with periods of medieval or ancient history or with some technical fields as for instance source publication where the ideological pressure was less intensive.

After the break-up of the USSR and the proclamation of the independent Ukrainian state, the situation rapidly changed. The Soviet model of Ukrainian history was quickly and painlessly abandoned. The old Soviet orthodoxy was replaced by the so-called “national paradigm”—a master narrative that focuses on the Ukrainian nation’s struggle for its own state. This narrative found its place first of all in synthetic works, such as university and secondary school textbooks, but also had an impact on the interpretation of certain events in academic research. Its traditional or canonical version sees Ukrainian history as a history of the origin and development of the Ukrainian ethnic nation, explains the nation’s differentiation from its neighbors, and emphasizes the continuity of the nation’s history over the course of more than 1,000 years. This continuity came at the cost of methodological shortcomings, including teleology, essentialism, presentism, and ethnocentrism.¹

The national paradigm relatively quickly gained ascendancy and became the new orthodoxy. There were at least two main reasons for the historians to endorse this approach. Some scholars, first of all representatives of the old Soviet academic establishment, simply followed the traditional way and reacted to the changing policy of the authorities which now was aimed at Ukrainian state and nation-building. Others, among them also former dissidents, endorsed the national paradigm because they saw this as the return to “truthful, unfalsified history,” represented by the works by the Ukrainian historians of the second half of the

¹ See an excellent account of this transformation: Serhy Ekelchuk, “Bridging the Past and the Future: Ukrainian History Writing Since Independence,” *Canadian Slavonic Papers/Revue canadienne des slavistes*. 2011, vol. LIII, no 2-3-4, pp. 559-573.

nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, such as Mykhailo Hrushevsky, V'iacheslav Lypyns'ky, Dmytro Bahaliy and others.

The main practical goals of this kind of history writing were the initial historical legitimation of the newly emergent state and the patriotic education of its citizens. It is worth mentioning that these aims were mostly implicit rather than explicitly stated. In spite of the heterogeneity of “nationalized” history in terms of academic quality, methodologies, and self-reflexivity of the authors, the common aim of this history writing was to show that the modern Ukrainian nation had a continuous common past that could become the basis for modern national identity. The famous non-conformist historian Yaroslav Dashkevych, one of the most consistent promoters of this idea in the 1990s, formulated it as follows: “...In spite of all this, I believe that the true history of Ukraine, the history of the struggle of the Ukrainian nation against occupiers and collaborators of all hues, for the construction of a truly independent Ukrainian state, will be written and will become the reference book for every honest politician, every honest statesman, every Ukrainian.”² In 1996, Vitaliy Sarbey, a representative of the old Soviet academic establishment, formulated his vision in the same vein as did the Soviet dissident Dashkevych: “We think the core of the political history of the Ukrainian people is its struggle for liberation, for its survival as ethnos, nation, and for the civil rights of every Ukrainian.”³ And here is another similar declaration from the survey of the twentieth-century Ukrainian history prepared at Taras Shevchenko National University in Kyiv and approved by the Ministry of Science and Education as a textbook for students majoring in history: “The history of Ukraine is the Ukrainian people’s path of struggling for independence... The history of the long-suffering Ukrainian people is filled with striking pages of brilliant victories for the cause of liberation and defeats which returned them to previous conditions. The centuries-old history of the Ukrainian ethnos passes historical feats of the people in its struggle for the independent state, for the equality with other peoples...on from one generation to another”. And the last example here in which the author, Ihor Hyrych, explicitly refers to the educational functions of the “nationalized” history of Ukraine: “Thereby, the rethinking of our past is happening in the direction of returning to unfalsified Ukrainian history, on the basis of which the new generations of Ukrainian must be educated.”⁴

A conceptual critique of this type of history writing appeared almost at the same time. One of its most interesting examples is the programmatic article “One Clio, Two Histories” by Natalia Yakovenko, one of the most authoritative figures within contemporary Ukrainian

² Yaroslav Dashkevych, „Pravdyva istoria Ukrainy bude napysana” (1999), in: Yaroslav Dashkevych. “...Uczy neloznymy ustamy skazaty pravdu”. *Istoryczna publitsystyka (1999-2008)*. Kyiv, 2011, p. 296.

³ Vitalij Sarbey, “Rozdumy z pryvodu fundamental’noi “Istorii Ukrainy.” *Kyivska starovyna*. 1995, no 2, p. 9.

⁴ Ihor Hyrych, *Kontseptual’ni problemy istorii Ukrainy*. Ternopil’: Navchal’na knyha-Bohdan, 2011, p. 131.

historiography.⁵ In this text Yakovenko builds her argument on the contraposition of science and “truths dear to one’s heart,” in other words, of academic history and the nation’s cultural memory. While revealing the numerous methodological and interpretative shortcomings of patriotic, “nationalized” history in independent Ukraine, however, Yakovenko acknowledges the importance of this type of history writing for the confirmation of social (national) identity. Thus she doesn’t condemn “nationalized” history completely, but highlights “the urgent necessity of ‘differentiation between the genres’ of didactic history (i.e., textbooks and popular history books) and research literature.”⁶ For Yakovenko, the task of patriotic and civil education, counterbalanced by an emphasis on tolerance and multiculturalism, has to be the mission of didactic (secondary school) history. As for professional historians, the author proposes they “take off the uniform of the fighting propagandists and relegate the kettledrums, trumpets, and other instruments for the glorification of the Fatherland to the museum of the history of science.”⁷ Thus the task of academic history is the unprejudiced and critical research into the past based on the methodological approaches and theoretical principles common to modern history writing worldwide. In this interpretation, academic history writing does not seek to perform any social function, at least Yakovenko does not mention such positive function, and the scholarly knowledge of the past is understood here as an end in itself.

In her other book *An Introduction to History*, in which she addresses first of all the younger generation of professional historians, Yakovenko supplements this analysis with a warning of the necessity of avoiding dealing with “hot” current problems because of the potential threat to historians’ scholarly integrity:

“It is worth, probably, mentioning that the historian – for the sake of compliance with his conscience – should better not deal with the burning issues of the day, where the danger of becoming the part of the struggle between ‘truth’ and ‘falsehood’ lies in wait for him everywhere. Because, as the wise Nikolay Karamzin once said: ‘History does not like those alive’. Let’s pass them to political scientists and sociologists, that is their specialty, however the specificity of our craft does not presupposes judgments about things which we cannot take in our hands because they are still burning.”⁸

Later in the same chapter, after enumerating professional scholars’ different reasons for studying history, she points out that they can be summarized as following: “...history interests us

⁵ Natalia Yakovenko, “Odna Klio, dvi istorii.” *Krytyka*, 2002, no 12, p. 12-14.

⁶ Yakovenko, *Odna Klio*, p. 13.

⁷ Yakovenko, *Odna Klio*, p. 14.

⁸ Natalia Yakovenko, *Vstup do istorii*. Kyiv: Krytyka, 2007, p. 24.

because it is interesting”, and quotes with approval Arnold J. Toynbee who when he was asked why did he study history replied: “for pleasure.”⁹

As one can see, Yakovenko advocates “history for its own sake” approach which has a long and respected pedigree. It can be traced back at least to the mid-nineteenth century and has become a pillar of the idea of history as autonomous scholarly discipline. The “history for its own sake” approach has been inseparable from the idea of historical objectivity - the profession’s “noble dream” – which maintains that in order to reach the truth about the past the historian should “extinguish one’s self” from his or her study, and to strive for the deliberate abandonment of the influence of the present on it.¹⁰ In the twentieth century, this approach became dominant among professional historians in the West, and it is supported by a part of the historical profession in today’s Ukraine, in particular by those historians who are critical of the traditional version of the national paradigm and those who do not deal with the history of Ukraine.

However, not all those skeptical of the national paradigm have rejected practical functions as such. Some of them considered deconstruction of historical myth and stereotypes to be the main history’s practical function. A well-known Kyiv historian, one of the most consistent critics of “nationalized” history in independent Ukraine, Georgiy Kasianov, provides a justification for this position.

In this connection, the most important is his most recent (2010) book, *Danse Macabre: The Famine of 1932-1933 in Politics, Mass Consciousness, and History Writing (1980s–early 2000s)*, which is an innovative study dealing with how the vision of the 1932-1933 Famine as a Holodomor (murder by hunger) was formed. While deconstructing stereotypes about the Famine, which he argues have become part of one of the most important Ukrainian historical myths, the author scrutinizes the role of professional historians in this process and stresses that the subordination of research to political suitability and state interests ultimately leads to a situation in which “the historian disappears and is replaced by the popularizer and the propagandist who *has the obligation* to fulfill a certain social mission, who must *prove* and *convey*, *interpret* and *persuade*”¹¹ [italics in original – V.S.].

Kasianov’s analysis of the role of historians in myth-making and historical policy related to the Famine shows that this is an exemplary case of the interaction between history and politics in which historians go beyond the boundaries of their profession and try to influence political

⁹ Ibidem, p. 25.

¹⁰ See: Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The ‘Objectivity Question’ and the American Historical Profession*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988; Jorma Kalela, *Making History: The Historian and Uses of the Past*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012, pp. 14-15.

¹¹ Georgiy Kasianov, *Danse macabre. Holod 1932-1933 rokiv u politytsi, masovij svidomosti ta istoriografii (1980-ti – pocztok 2000-h)*. Kyiv: Fact, 2010, p. 188.

and social life. This allows him to conclude that “in this interaction power *always* wins—power as an institution as well as a discourse—if the historian surrenders his inviolable right to intellectual sovereignty” [italics added – V.S.].¹² As one can see, these statements presuppose that any practical positive functions of history-writing directed at influencing and changing society should be treated as the betrayal of scholarly ideals, and an attempt to perform these functions inevitably lead to catastrophic consequences for the scholar who ceases to be a historian and is turned into the propagandist and popularizer.

This radical statement, which ultimately constitutes one of the basic theoretical arguments of Kasianov’s study, is related to his declaration at the beginning of the book: «...*the speculations, reflections, conclusions, and generalizations are meant exclusively for academic discussion*... I am not a member of any political party or movement, I don’t fulfill any political or ideological orders, and I don’t consider the judgments, conclusions and generalizations in this book suitable for use in historical politics, civic education, or propaganda» [italics added – V.S.].¹³

Kasianov understands that a defense of this radical position requires not only a serious empirical base, but also an effective theoretical legitimation. In *Danse Macabre* he applies the concept of the well-known American theoretician of history Allan Megill,¹⁴ who in fact follows a reductionistic approach to understanding the social relevance of historical studies. Megill identifies three basic types of history writing: affirmative, which attempts to form the basis for contemporary identities and the social order; didactic, which offers concrete recommendations for the present and the future; and critical, which is oriented primarily at a critical rethinking of the past and tradition. Among these, Megill prefers the last type (though with some reservations). Megill’s reductive approach to the social relevance of history is expressed in the following thesis, which eloquently echoes Kasianov’s statements above: “A critical historiography does not prescribe for the present. It only shows what is different and surprising—astounding, even—in the past.”¹⁵

Both Kasianov and Megill acknowledge the duty of the historian to criticize the abuse of history committed by politicians and other public figures and *Danse Macabre* is an exemplary instance of such criticism. However, as Kasianov’s declaration at the beginning of the monograph demonstrates, he is inclined to limit the audience of his book to the scholarly community. Surely, this declaration has rather a rhetorical character because the author is not

¹² Kasianov, *Danse macabre*, p. 189.

¹³ Kasianov, *Danse macabre*, p. 4.

¹⁴ In this case I have in mind the book by Megill “Historical Knowledge, Historical Error: A Contemporary Guide to Practice” (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2007).

¹⁵ Megill, *Historical Knowledge*, p. 40.

able to control who will and who will not read his book, and it was likely an emotional reaction to the excessive politicization of the topic of Great Famine in the independent Ukraine. At the same time, it also reflects a widespread belief among the historians critical to the national paradigm that historical objectivity is impossible without the detachment from the surrounding society.

As we have seen, the opponents of “nationalized history” reject the ambitions of academic history to perform an affirmative function for contemporary society. But they do not propose any other practical function, apart from the deconstruction of myths and stereotypes that could be performed by history writing. Naturally, for the majority of historians, trained in an understanding of history as “magistra vitae,” this negative (deconstructive) understanding of the practical role of their discipline in contemporary society seems unsatisfactory. Ukrainian historians, accustomed to combining historical research with the roles of either national awakeners or fighters on the ideological front, are inclined to see history writing as performing an important positive role within society; they mostly fail, however, to reformulate this role adequately for the world of the 21st century. For example, Yaroslav Isaievych admits in an interview with the *Day* newspaper: “I’d like history to fulfill some higher social mission...”¹⁶ His subsequent comments make clear that what he had in mind was primarily history’s role in the formation of national consciousness, with the caveat that historians should not distort historical facts in the name of this high mission. In a speech delivered to a conference entitled “Historical Science on the Eve of the 21st Century,” another well-known historian, Valeriy Smoliy, while reflecting on the social significance of history, highlighted the risk of a new mythologization of the past and noted: “I am far from idea that historical science can be depoliticized and deideologized completely. That is a utopia. But historical research ought to be out in front of politics and help politicians in solving complicated problems of state. This is how I see the intersection of historical science and politics.”¹⁷ Unfortunately, Smoliy did not identify the mechanisms of these interactions.

It’s worth noting here that above-mentioned pattern has been typical for many other eastern European countries. For example, the Polish historian of historiography Rafal Stobiecki speaks about two traditional images of Polish historians that are still dominant today. The first type is the “‘neutral observer’, ‘impartial searcher for truth’ who is guided only by cognitive pursuits,” and the second one “identifies the historian as the ‘spiritual guide and educator of the nation’, who would like to transform history into the treasury of useful knowledge and an

¹⁶ Yaroslav Isaievych, “Piznajte pravdu i pravda vas vriatue” - interv’iu z Irynoiu Ehorovoiu, *Den*. 10 bereznia 2006 roku.

¹⁷ Valeriy Smoliy, “‘Vstupne slovo’ do uczasnykiv vseukrainskoi konferentsii istorykiv u Kharkovi.” *Kharkivskyj istoriohraficznyj zbirnyk*. Kharkiv, 1997, vol. 2, p. 12.

important part of common opinion.” These two images can be traced back to the nineteenth century, but they have been updated and gained new justification after the fall of communism.¹⁸ In a similar vein, the Russian theorist of history, Nikolay Kaposov, describing the contemporary historiographic scene in Russia, identifies proponents of the national paradigm (in the Russian case with strong imperialist connotations) who mostly support the historical policy initiated by Vladimir Putin, and those who are against political instrumentalization of history, but together with it they tend to reject any practical use of history in society at all.¹⁹ Both Stobiecki and Kaposov acknowledge the inadequacy of these approaches in the new circumstances of the 21st century.

Taking this into account, one might suppose that here we see some regional problem which refers to the belated attempt—due to the period of censorship during the communism—to come to grips with the issues of the domination of the national paradigm and the role of academic history-writing in the public life. However, I would dare to argue that the problem goes much deeper, and here one can see a regional variation of some global phenomenon related to the paradigmatic change that took place in the Western history-writing in the last decades of the twentieth century. This paradigmatic change is well documented and it has been analyzed by the theorists of history from different perspectives. In this study, I endorse the interpretation proposed by the Finnish theorist of history Jorma Kalela in his recent book *Making History: The Historian and Uses of the Past* (2012), in which he distinguishes between two main dimensions of the paradigmatic change. The first dimension refers to the appearance of a new perspective on actors, themes and approaches. The second one refers to the linguistic turn, which challenged the main theoretical assumptions of the discipline, for instance the ideas of historical truth and historical objectivity.²⁰

In the first case, we deal with changes from within the historical profession that were initiated in the 1970s. As Kalela puts it:

In other words, historical enquiry underwent successful insurgence against elitism and nationalism that hitherto had dominated mainstream research. This was rooted in opposition to ideas like that of high politics and great men as being the “proper” substance of history. Today...all sorts of orientations ranging from micro- to macro-history, from cultural to multi-cultural history, from environmental to global history, flourish. All of these “perspectival paradigms,” as the London historian Mary Fulbrook

¹⁸ Rafal Stobiecki, Historycy wobec polityki historycznej, in: *Pamięć i polityka historyczna: doświadczenia Polski i jej sąsiadów*, ed. by S.M. Nowinowski, J. Pomorski, R. Stobiecki. Łódź, 2008, pp. 187-188.

¹⁹ Nikolay Kaposov, *Pamiat' strogogo rezhima: istoriia i politika v Rosii*. Moskva: NLO, 2011, pp. 181-228.

²⁰ Jorma Kalela, *Making History: The Historian and Uses of the Past*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012, pp. 5-6.

aply calls them, have legitimate status, and there is no consensus according to which only some of them represent “real” historical research.²¹

In the second case, initially the changes had come from outside, mainly from philosophy and literary studies, and then were adopted within the discipline by such theorists as Hayden White, Frank Ankersmit, Kit Jenkins and others. I’ll not go into details here. What is important for my topic is that despite the fact that practice of history-writing in the West had undergone dramatic changes in the last few decades, its theoretical foundations were rethought only selectively. This is especially true in the case of the issue of history’s place in a wider social context. Such a situation creates an embarrassment among professional historians, who, as far as the issue of the purpose of history is concerned, “don’t know what they are doing anymore,”²² as Tony Judt aptly put it.

If one looks at the Ukrainian case from this perspective, one might see that the Ukrainian debate on national history was not so much about possibility/impossibility or correctness/incorrectness of the national paradigm, but was rather an attempt to question the status of the national paradigm as the only legitimate way of writing Ukrainian history and to establish the limits of the historian’s purview. The traditional master narrative of Ukrainian history might be fairly criticized for its numerous drawbacks that I partly mentioned above. At the same time, according to contemporary scholarly knowledge, it is impossible to deny that the history of the most part of the territory of today’s Ukraine at least since the seventeenth century can be legitimately written as the history of emergence and formation of the Ukrainian nation and its subsequent struggle for the creation of the independent Ukrainian state. The problem rather lies in the fact that many proponents of the national paradigm are not ready to recognize that there are also other legitimate perspectives from which history of Ukraine can be written, and that both supporters and opponents of the traditional national history do not fully understand the consequences of the existence of these legitimate multiple perspectives.

In this article, I would like to touch on only a consequence for the understanding of the social relevance of history. Strange as it may seem, the proponents of the national paradigm in general have more exact intuition of the proper role of history in public life than its opponents, namely they believe that academic history-writing is inevitably involved in the surrounding society. However, they tend to reduce this involvement to the issues of the role of history in the formation of national identity and memory. In the case of independent Ukraine, this means that by promoting the master narrative of Ukrainian history, academic history-writing should play the role of a remedy for the sovietization and russification of the Soviet times and contribute to the

²¹ Ibidem, p. 8.

²² Tony Judt with Timothy Snyder, *Thinking the Twentieth Century*. New York: Penguin Books, 2012, p. 259.

creation of the national identity and memory common for the whole country. This reductionism at least partly steams from their inability to recognize the existence of other legitimate perspectives from which Ukrainian history can be written. Another important moment is that when we deal with the activities of the proponents of “nationalized” history, we often encounter not a responsible use but rather abuse of history. The problem here is, first of all, with an often naïve and vague concept of historical objectivity that the historians working in this vein use, and resulting from this, an inability to distinguish between the spheres of scholarship and politics. When I speak about the “naive” understanding of the objectivity, I mean for instance the following declaration in the introduction to the university textbook of the twentieth-century history of Ukraine prepared by the collective of authors of the Taras Shevchenko Kyiv National University: “Taking into account the fact that modern history of Ukraine is a subject of debates between historians representing different approaches and schools, the material of the textbook is presented on the basis of primary sources which is the guarantee of scholarly objectivity.”²³

Even in cases where the understanding of the objectivity is more sophisticated, the situation is not much better. The approach of Ihor Hyrych, a specialist in modern Ukrainian intellectual and political history, and open-minded proponent of the national paradigm, is very characteristic in this regard. Trying to justify the necessity of rethinking and rewriting of history in the independent Ukraine, he maintains that a single and invariable objective history simply does not exist.²⁴ Later he emphasizes the importance of the notion of historical truth for the understanding of historical objectivity. According to Hyrych, the historical truth has two main dimensions. The first dimension refers to “the correspondence of events, phenomena and facts described in a work to real events fixed in the objective archival sources.” The second one refers to “the interpretation and treatment of historical events, personages and phenomena according to the truth, which should take into account polar positions.”²⁵ However, he also mentions that both these dimensions are rather ideals that cannot be attained in reality because every historical account is not the past itself but an idea and narrative about it. Thereby, according to Hyrych, every historical account contains subjective elements, and this constitutes the main argument in favor of the rewriting of history. Our understanding of history has been changing due to the changes in the political and social context, appearance of new evidences and new theoretical knowledge in other humanities and social sciences.²⁶

²³ A.H. Sliusarenko, V.I. Husev, V.M. Lytvyn ta in. *Novitnia istoria Ukrainy (1900-2000): pidruchnyk*. Kyiv: Vysha Shkola, 2002, p. 7.

²⁴ Hyrych, *Kontseptual'ni problemy*, p. 128.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 135.

²⁶ *Ibidem*.

However, in other parts of his book, Hyrych emphasizes first of all the importance of the political context for the rewriting of history. He points to numerous examples of the dependence of academic historiography on political conjuncture, ranging from Bismarck's Germany to the USSR, and maintains: "any political change in any country causes also a change in the interpretation of history."²⁷ According to the Kyiv historian: "Every historiography creates one's circle of heroes, one's attitude to different past's events. When the two opposite perspectives exist, the two opposite groups of heroes emerges. Those figures, who are treated positively in Russian historiography, receive a negative treatment in the Ukrainian one, and vice versa... This example shows that it is difficult, and often impossible, to speak about the sole truth and objectivity in history."²⁸

It is not stated openly, but, in fact, this declaration implies the acknowledgement of the well-known dictum which proclaims that "history is a continuation of politics by other means," and that academic history-writing should fulfill the objectives set by politics. Ihor Hyrych follows this logic when he emphasizes that the textbooks of Ukrainian history for secondary schools should not just show different perspectives, but educate pupils in the spirit of reverence for Ukrainian, and not Russian or Polish, heroes.²⁹ However, much more important in this regard is his support of the idea of historical policy. Following Rafal Stobiecki, by the historical policy, I understand "a synonym for consciousness and purposeful activities conducted by the authorities in order to preserve a certain image of the past in society."³⁰ Hyrych welcomes the creation of the Institutes of National Remembrance in several countries of East-Central Europe after the fall of communism. The similar institute was created in Ukraine in 2007 by the initiative of the president Victor Yushchenko and was staffed with the professional historians. The Kyiv historian supports the idea that the state should take care of the issue of collective memory and adds that this is especially true in the case of post-communist countries that now should overcome negative consequences of the sovietization and russification of the communist period. Taking this into account, the historical policy in Ukraine should involve "consistent explanatory and enlightenment work aimed at the overcoming of the instinct of the postcolonial man, the formation of resistant feelings against the neo-imperialist policy of today's Russia..."³¹ However, the most important thing is that he entrusts professional historians with this task, noting that "instruments of the historical policy, besides the Institute for National Remembrance, are the state agencies responsible for the humanitarian sphere. These are Ministries of Science

²⁷ Ibidem, p. 130.

²⁸ Ibidem, p. 131.

²⁹ Ibidem, pp. 123-124.

³⁰ Stobiecki, *Historycy i polityka historyczna*, p. 175.

³¹ Hyrych, *Kontsetual'ni problemy*, p. 146.

and Education, Culture, the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and its research institutes, and the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences. In their activity, they should constantly take into account the necessity of the enlightenment of the people, the creation of corresponding educational programs, the scholarly investigation of the issues of collective memory....”³²

One may argue whether these objectives are good or bad, but regardless of the answer, it is clear that these are political objectives that force the historian to perform, first of all, educational and affirmative functions rather than a critical one. To put it differently, there are two main dangers inherent in this approach. First, it rejects the impartiality of the scholar as such, which in the case of history is always relative, forcing the historian to evaluate one’s historical accounts and accounts by other scholars on the basis of the national identity of their authors. Second, the historical discipline ceases to be an autonomous sphere and becomes dependent on politics with all-ensuing consequences. When history-writing ceases to be autonomous, the responsible use might easily turn into abuse of history, and the historian might be easily turned into the state official, propagandist or politician.

However, does the fact that history has been abused in the past and will doubtless continue being abused in the future mean that we have to reject the idea of the social relevance of history-writing entirely?

Many of the opponents of the traditional “nationalized” history in Ukraine tend to answer affirmatively, and the views of Natalya Yakovenko and Georgy Kasyanov I mentioned earlier are very characteristic in this regard. They sincerely want to avoid the situation when history is abused, but the remedies they propose might solve only a part of the problem. On the one hand, they hold a more nuanced and balanced view of historical objectivity emphasizing the necessity of the historian’s detachment from the interpretations he or she proposes and from those that are proposed by other scholars. Thereby, they consider the critical function of history-writing to be more important than the educational and affirmative ones. On other hand, the way they approach the relationship between academic history-writing and society raises many questions. It is based on the assumption that historical objectivity is impossible without the historian’s detachment from society and current topical concerns. Instead of trying to understand complex interrelationships between historiography and surrounding social setting, they tend to reduce it to the binary opposition between “objectivists” and the “representatives of partisanship” as Reinhart Kosseleck called the two groups. That is, between those historians who opt for impartiality and seeking for truth, and those ones who subordinate their research to the immediate political (in the broad sense) objectives. Natalya Yakovenko designates the two camps as the “lovers of truth” and “flatterers” and states that this division can be traced back to

³² Ibidem, p. 147.

ancient Greece and it remains relevant today.³³ Kasianov pushes this position to its logical conclusion when he declaratively maintains that the conclusions of his book “are meant exclusively for academic discussion”, so that he wants to achieve this “objectivism” or impartiality not only on the level of research but also on the level of the impact of the work which he believes must be limited to the narrow circle of other impartial and objective scholars.

However, this position is erroneous and even harmful for the discipline because it refers to some abstract principles but disregards the peculiarities of the practice of history-writing, namely the simple fact that “the questions specialists on the past seek to answer are embedded in society and their finding influence it” as Jorma Kalela put it.³⁴ This means that at least on these two levels academic historiography is inevitably involved in surrounding society and instead of rejecting this obvious fact, historians should better think through how to manage their present-mindedness.

If one looks closer at the historiographic practice one might understand that the issue of relevance is embedded in it right from the beginning, namely from the initial stage of the study on which one formulates research questions and problems. Every historical account refers to a certain selection of events from the immense and boundless past that were chosen on the basis of their importance for those who live in the present. And, in most cases, certain events and problems are chosen for the scholarly investigation because they do matter not only for the community of professional historians, but also for a wider public. In this connection, it’s not surprisingly, for example, that Yakovenko and Kasianov have devoted their professional careers to the studying of Ukrainian history and not Australian or Venezuelan ones.

The above-mentioned paradigmatic change has only made this situation even more evident. Taking into account this, the best possible way out for historians would be to reconsider patterns of thought with poor foundations and envisage new strategies for managing their present-mindedness in a way that allows upholding the core principles of historical enquiry.³⁵

It worth mentioning that a growing number of Ukrainian historians think that they should deal with the problems important for the general audience, and the growing participation of the academic historians in the public-intellectual activity which I have analyzed in another article is the best evidence of this tendency.³⁶ However, the implications of it have not yet become the subject of the explicit discussion.

³³ Yakovenko, *Vstup do istorii*, pp. 22-24.

³⁴ Kalela, *Making history*, p. 15.

³⁵ *Ibidem*.

³⁶ Volodymyr Sklokin. “Staiuchy publichnymy: istoryky iak publichni intelektualy u postradians’kii Ukraini.” *Krytyka*, 2014, no 5-6, pp. 30-37.

The question, which is probably the most important in this regard, is what might become an alternative to the traditional approaches to the social functions of the history-writing? The proponents of the national paradigm think history-writing should affirm national identity and collective memory, whereas the opponents of “nationalized” history view history first of all as a means of personal cultural enrichment. What they are ready to accept at best is a negative practical function for the history-writing, namely the debunking of historical myths and stereotypes. In my view, the concept of “critical public” history proposed by British social historian and theorist of history John Tosh in his recent book *Why History Matters?* (2008), might play the role of such alternative.

Tosh suggests that historians should reconsider their understanding of the practical importance of history for contemporary society. The concept of “critical applied history” allows for the historian to choose acute problems of contemporary society for study, but this study should make use of the basic principles and methods of the historian’s craft.³⁷ Many of the problems and challenges faced by states and societies have important historical and comparative dimensions, many of which are often unknown to politicians and ordinary citizens. They in turn see the problems from a very narrow perspective and often do not make appropriate decisions. From this point of view, the historian’s task is primarily to understand the significance of the results of their research, and the results of research in related humanities and social sciences, for an understanding of urgent social and political questions.³⁸ The resulting research might take the form either of the traditional scholarly monograph or article or a contribution to the public intellectual debate. But what is the most important that the historian does not propose ready-made answers or prescriptions about how to solve certain problems. The historian’s task is first and foremost to expand the horizon and to show another (and possibly more productive) way of discussing the problem. As formulated by Tosh himself: “Most significant in critical public history is the sense of intellectual tension that is transmitted. The more that this history appeals to non-professional audiences, the more obvious it becomes that the significance of this history lies in posing new questions rather than solving them, in the demonstration of new options rather than insisting on answers.”³⁹

Another important feature of this approach is that it does not demand a practical program for all subfields of historical studies. It acknowledges that there are topics and problems generated by the internal logic of the development of academic history writing. At the same time, it encourages historians to pay attention to those themes and problems that are important for

³⁷ John Tosh, *Why History Matters*, p. 22.

³⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 16.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 23.

contemporary society. However, in both cases researchers should uphold the core principles of historical inquiry, even if in the case of critical public history their work might more often take the form of historical synthesis than of original research.

In my opinion, Tosh's approach is especially interesting because it is not merely an abstract idea. It is, in fact, an attempt to describe and conceptualize existing historical works first of all in British historiography. One can find similar approaches also in eastern Europe. If one speaks about Ukraine, the L'viv historian Yaroslav Hrytsak is the most notable example of "critical public history." He is a historian who not only practices a similar approach, but also has taken some steps in the direction of its conceptualization. However, Ukrainian historians have only been starting to realize this problem. If this paper shows anything, it is the fact that in order to reach agreement on how to write Ukrainian history in the new circumstances, both proponents and opponents of the national paradigm at first should reconsider their outdated meta-historical foundations regarding historical objectivity, as well interrelationships between history-writing and society, and establish new limits of the historian's purview.

Abstract

The article reviews the debate on the social relevance of history between proponents and opponents of the national paradigm in contemporary Ukrainian history-writing in the context of the recent paradigmatic change in the Western historiography. It shows that this debate has revolved around two competing views of academic history-writing's proper relationships with politics and society. Having demonstrated the limitations of both dominant approaches, it concludes with the discussing of some possible alternatives, in particular of the concept of the "critical public history" developed by John Tosh, and practiced in Ukraine by Yaroslav Hrytsak.