



CONSERVATIVES AND RIGHT RADICALS IN INTERWAR EUROPE

Edited by Marco Bresciani

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INTEGRAL NATIONALISM IN THE ABSENCE OF A NATION-STATE

The case of Ukraine

Oleksandr Zaitsev

In 1935, one of the main ideologues of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), Mykola Stsiborskyi, wrote that the example of fascism should be a guide for enslaved peoples.

For those of them who fearfully turn away from the imperative precepts of fascism because of their blind, uncritical attachment to the narcosis of demo-socialist prejudices about ‘peace, harmony, prosperity,’ and Internationals – they will never have true peace and freedom. The destiny of such peoples is to be manure for others!¹

Ukrainian radical nationalists of the 1930s did not turn away from “the imperative precepts of fascism.” On the contrary, they readily accepted them. Had they become fascists themselves, following this “guide”?

Two contradictory and almost mutually exclusive positions still compete in the historiography of the interwar and wartime Ukrainian Nationalist² movement: one exposes its extremist, totalitarian, “genocidal” and “fascist” nature, denying it any liberation and democratic elements;³ the other emphasises the liberation character of its struggle for an independent state, rejecting or ignoring totalitarian and fascistic elements in its ideology and practice altogether.⁴ These positions in historiography are closely linked to contemporary public discussions, which are structured around two dominant discourses. The first, condemnatory, discourse has focused on the OUN’s attitude toward Nazi Germany before its invasion of the USSR, the role of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in the Polish–Ukrainian conflict and the supposed involvement of both organisations in the Holocaust. The second, apologetic and heroic, discourse has celebrated the OUN and UPA for their contribution to the Ukrainian national

liberation struggle.⁵ There is also a third, “balanced,” position in historiography that is much more focused on comprehensive research than on accusations or glorification.⁶

In this chapter, I try to move beyond the confrontation of “fascist” and “national-liberationist” interpretations of the Ukrainian radical nationalism. My basic assumption is that the struggle for independence of Ukraine and the “epoch of fascism” in Europe are historical contexts equally important for an adequate understanding of Ukrainian *integral nationalism* of the interwar period.

Ukrainian integral nationalism

The concept of integral nationalism⁷ describes well the ideological content and practice of the political movement that emerged in Western Ukraine (or South-Eastern Poland), and in various Ukrainian political exile circles in the 1920s and 1930s. It comprised three main trends: the “active nationalism” of Dmytro Dontsov and his followers, “organised nationalism” of the OUN, and “creative nationalism” of the Front of National Unity led by Dmytro Paliiv.⁸

Here I define integral nationalism as a form of authoritarian nationalism⁹ that posits the nation as an organic whole, and demands the unreserved subordination of an individual to the interests of his or her nation, which are placed above the interests of any social group, other nations and humanity as a whole.

The term “integral nationalism” is very close to “ultranationalism.” According to Roger Griffin, ultranationalism is based on

a concept of the nation as a living organism that can thrive, die, or regenerate, a suprapersonal community with a life history and destiny of its own that predates and survives ‘mere’ individuals and imparts a higher purpose to their lives.¹⁰

One can use the terms “integral nationalism” and “ultranationalism” interchangeably, as Griffin sometimes did.¹¹

Carlton J. H. Hayes, who introduced the term “integral nationalism” into academic usage as a generic concept, believed that it had to do “not with ‘oppressed’ or ‘subject’ nationalities, but rather with nationalities which have already gained their political unity and independence.”¹² Similarly, according to Peter Alter, integral nationalism develops when the goal of *Risorgimento* nationalism – the creation of its own nation-state – is reached.¹³ However, referring to Ukrainian nationalism and later on other examples, John A. Armstrong demonstrated that integral nationalism could also develop in the absence of nation-state.¹⁴ Of course, such nationalism had to have significant differences from the integral nationalism in nation-states, combining authoritarianism and the tendency to absorb a person by the nation with the desire to liberate that nation.

Before the First World War, the integral nationalist movements were already in place in most European countries, but the Ukrainian national movement was still predominantly democratic, partly liberal and partly socialist.¹⁵ It also remained democratic during the Ukrainian Revolution, which unfolded amid the collapse of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires. Just in the 1920s, some Ukrainian ideologues, first of all, Dmytro Dontsov, borrowed and transplanted to the Ukrainian soil the ideas of integral nationalism that have been spreading in Europe since the late 19th century. However, in the history of intellectual movements, as Marc Bloch rightly observed, the mere fact of borrowing “foreign formulae” can hardly explain anything.

For the problem is still to know why the transference of ideas took place when it did – no sooner and no later. A contagion supposes two things: microbe multiplication and, at the moment when the disease strikes, a favourable breeding-ground.¹⁶

Besides, not all ideas of the Ukrainian Nationalists had foreign origins. According to Alexander Motyl, “the historical and ideological origins of the Nationalist ideology are to be found first and foremost in the Ukrainian conservative parties and ideologies.”¹⁷

The emergence of integral nationalism is usually preceded by a crisis of national self-confidence, supposed extraordinary dangers from outside and real or perceived threats to the nation’s continued existence. This is especially noticeable when a nation has suffered a crushing military or political defeat, damaging its collective sense of self-esteem.¹⁸ All these preconditions existed in Ukraine after the defeat of the Ukrainian War for Independence (1917–1921). The defeat weighed upon the Nationalists’ ideological quests in the interwar period, forcing them to choose paths other than those followed by their predecessors. Dontsov proposed another path, rejecting the democratic, socialist and cosmopolitan ideas of the leaders of the Revolution and affirming reckless national egoism, and a cult of power and struggle.

In the 1920s, integral nationalism of the Dontsov type competed in Western Ukraine and in the circles of Ukrainian emigration with Sovietophilism. After the Entente’s recognition of Poland’s sovereignty over Eastern Galicia (March 1923) and the beginning of Ukrainisation in Soviet Ukraine, some nationalists began to view the latter as a Ukrainian national state being created under the Soviet aegis, and the Bolsheviks strongly supported these moods.¹⁹ However, since the late 1920s, the traumatic experiences of communist totalitarianism, terror and the suppression of national culture in Soviet Ukraine influenced the evolution of Ukrainian nationalism outside the USSR. The perception of a threat to the very physical existence of the Ukrainian people gave the Nationalist movement the radical form perceived as necessary to save the nation from communism. The discriminatory policy of the Polish state towards the Ukrainians

also pushed them toward radicalisation. The Polish historian Grzegorz Motyka sums up the interwar period of Ukrainian life in Poland as follows:

One should recognise that it did not bring too many good experiences to the Ukrainians. Compared to the years of the Habsburg rule, the socio-cultural circumstances of their lives had obviously deteriorated, and the career path was almost completely closed for the Ukrainian intelligentsia; failure to keep the promise of introducing self-government in Galicia or creating a Ukrainian university had led the Ukrainians to a great deal of distrust of all sorts of Polish assurances.²⁰

Motyka notes that paradoxically, those Polish politicians who tried to solve national problems of the Second Republic with the use of force appeared to be allies of Ukrainian Nationalists.²¹ The violence of the Polish authorities justified the violent actions of the Ukrainian underground in the eyes of Ukrainians.

The journalist Dmytro Dontsov became the most important ideologue of Ukrainian integral nationalism. Starting as a Marxist, a social democrat and an enemy of nationalism, Dontsov, during 1912–1923, underwent a complex evolution through the ideas of political separatism and a kind of conservative nationalism to militant integral nationalism. In 1926, Dontsov published his main ideological work, *Nationalism*,²² which became a political gospel for his adherents and helped further distinguish the new, authoritarian Ukrainian nationalism from the democratic current of the national movement.

Reflecting on the causes of the defeat of the independence struggle, Dontsov came to the conclusion that the democratic and socialist ideological baggage of the leaders of the Ukrainian Revolution should be discarded and replaced by pure national egoism and a belief in the historical mission of the nation. Another impetus for his transformation of values was the Fascist Revolution in Italy. Dontsov saw in Fascism a model for the movement that he sought to create – an energetic, uncompromising, authoritarian movement of an active minority imbued with a fanatical belief in its ideals and capable of mobilising and leading a nation.

This reevaluation of values required new intellectual sources. The attempts to derive “active nationalism” directly from the Ukrainian tradition, in particular from the poetry of Taras Shevchenko – from which Dontsov allegedly made historiosophical and “natosophical” conclusions and only later found confirmations of them in the works of Western thinkers²³ – are unconvincing. Rather, Dontsov sought and found in Shevchenko’s poems confirmations of the ideas he read in the writings by Friedrich Nietzsche, Rudyard Kipling, Oswald Spengler, Vilfredo Pareto and his other idols. Among the intellectual sources of “active nationalism,” the most important were the philosophical ideas of Arthur Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Spengler and Henri Bergson, social Darwinism, Maurice Barrès and Charles Maurras’s French integral nationalism, George Sorel’s theory

of social myths and revolutionary violence, Gustave Le Bon's crowd psychology and the elite theories of Viacheslav Lypynskiy and Vilfredo Pareto. According to Roman Wysocki, "active nationalism" also contains clear traces of the influence of Polish integral nationalist thinkers, especially Roman Dmowski.²⁴ The influence of Russian thinkers on Dontsov is not quite clear. He categorically denied any Russian influence on his worldview, but Trevor Erlacher thinks otherwise:

However much he hated Russian hegemony, his ideology owed a sizable intellectual debt to Russian thinkers – particularly to the Slavophiles and Pan-Slavists with their attacks on Western civilisation, materialism, science, democracy, liberalism, socialism, and modernity. Well before Benito Mussolini or the French integral nationalist Maurice Barrès appeared in Dontsov's writing, Fyodor Dostoevsky, Konstantin Leontiev, Nikolai Danilevsky, Dmitry Merezhkovsky, and Vasilii Rozanov exerted a key influence on his worldview.²⁵

Dontsov indeed quoted these thinkers, especially in his *Foundations of Our Politics*,²⁶ but used their quotes to expose Russian messianism and its hostility to the West. Did he really master their philosophy, turning it against the country of origin as Erlacher believes? So far, this is only a hypothesis, the verification of which requires a deeper study of Dontsov's intellectual biography before 1922.

Dontsov's ideology in its complete form can be seen as a paradigmatic model of integral nationalism, even more than the primary integral nationalism of Charles Maurras who coined the term. Dontsov was a perfect integral nationalist, regarding the nation as a collective personality. He endowed it with the will to life and power; demanded the complete subordination of an individual to his nation; rejected universal values and morality in the name of national egoism; believed that relations between nations were subject to the law of the struggle for survival; and rejected the liberal model of democracy as one which reduced the national elite – the carrier of national will – to the level of mass.

Dontsov's works influenced the formation of the OUN, which emerged in Western Ukraine and emigrant circles from two main sources – the paramilitary underground and youth groups inspired by the ideas of "active nationalism." Stepan Lenkavskiy, the OUN's leader in 1959–1968, remembered that the young Nationalists in 1920s, seeking theoretical justifications for their views, turned to the works of the conservative thinker Viacheslav Lypynskiy²⁷ and Dmytro Dontsov, although the latter's influence on them was much greater. Young Ukrainians were impressed by his desire to form by his works "a healthy and battle-worthy type of Ukrainian man, depriving him of his traditional toothlessness, shakiness, softness and spinelessness." They fully accepted Dontsov's voluntarism and cult of power, his rejection of internationalism, federalism and autonomy, and his criticism of the weakness of Ukrainian political thought.²⁸ This influence was not hampered by the lack of a system and consistent argumentation,

which was overcompensated by Dontsov's journalistic talent, while Lypynskyi's theoretical constructs proved to be difficult for many young readers.

It is unknown how many young Nationalists actually read Dontsov's works, but a more educated part of them did read. Daria Rebet, who in 1929 became a member of the OUN Youth, later remembered: "We studied Dontsov very carefully." Of course, nobody went with Dontsov's writings to the rural youth who had only a rural school behind them, but high school students (members of the OUN Youth) had to read his *Nationalism* chapter by chapter. If someone did not read Dontsov, it meant that he was "not ours."²⁹

The constituent Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists in Vienna in 1929 approved the main foundations of the OUN's ideology: it declared the Ukrainian nation "the starting point for all activity and the end goal of every undertaking by a Ukrainian nationalist,"³⁰ and proclaimed that the main goal of the nation in the situation of its political subjugation was an independent united state to be acquired through the national revolution.

The apparent successes of totalitarian political movements and regimes in the 1930s gave rise to the belief that Ukrainian nationalism must follow a similar path in order to survive and win. In 1935, the OUN's ideologist Mykola Stsi-borskyi published his *Natiocracy* (*Natsiokratiiia*), which was, in fact, an attempt to design a Ukrainian model of totalitarianism with a one-party system, ideological monopoly of the OUN, almost unlimited power of the "Leader of the Nation," etc.³¹ The OUN socio-economic platform was, in essence, a project of an alternative, non-liberal and non-communist, modernisation of society through the establishment of a corporate state and a nationalist developmental dictatorship, modelled on Fascist Italy.

The OUN's political strategy was aimed primarily at preparing the national revolution. Members of the OUN in the 1930s formulated the concept of a "permanent revolution," according to which continuous fighting was intended to provoke revolutionary ferment, drawing large masses of people into the revolutionary ranks.³² In part, this succeeded: on the eve of the Second World War, the OUN had 8,000–9,000 full members, surrounded by a large number of members of the OUN Youth and an even larger group of sympathisers of the organisation.³³

The view of the nation as a collective personality led logically to the belief that the enemies of the Ukrainian people are not only the governments and ruling classes of the invading states but the whole "enemy nations." The brochure *Our Struggle: Its Purposes, Ways, and Methods* (1931), published on behalf of the Regional Executive of the OUN, emphasised that the national enemies of the Ukrainians, who destroy them and prevent them from creating an independent state, are not only governments but also peoples at will of which the governments exist and rule – the Poles, the Russians and so on.³⁴

Jews were not initially considered a "hostile element." Although some members of the OUN did not hide their negative attitude towards them, a conciliatory

position was dominant. In 1930, OUN's official journal *Rozbudova Natsii* (Nation Building) featured an article by Stsiborskyi, who called Ukrainians and Jews to come to an agreement and argued that the task of the future Ukrainian government would be "to grant Jews an equal status and opportunity to appear in every sphere of social, cultural, and other activity."³⁵ Such a policy, the author hoped, would promote the Ukrainian patriotism in the Jewish masses. However, Stsiborskyi's appeal remained unanswered. Neither the OUN nor the Jewish political organisations made any real steps towards mutual understanding. Moreover, very soon (especially after 1933) the OUN strategy placed Jews among the "enemy nations" alongside Russians and Poles.

The core myth of Ukrainian integral nationalism was that of national regeneration (palingenesis) in a post-liberal new order based on the domination of strong nations and races. According to it, the nationalist revolution will not only destroy the external enemies of the nation, but also cleanse it of the alien, poisonous, hostile elements that decompose the nation from within, and revive it for a new life. Like other integral nationalist movements in Europe, the Ukrainian Nationalists tended to sacralise politics and create a kind of secular religion. To emphasise that the OUN was not just a party, but a "separate faith in the political sphere," Stepan Lenkavskyi in 1929 wrote "The Ten Commandments of a Ukrainian Nationalist," better known as the "Decalogue." In the original version of the "Decalogue," some precepts were formulated in the spirit of Dontsov's demands of "amorality" and "imperialism":

- 7 You will not hesitate to commit the greatest crime if the good of the cause requires it.
- 8 With hatred and guile you will meet the enemies of your Nation. [...]
- 10 You will strive for expansion of power, space and wealth of the Ukrainian state even by enslavement of foreigners.³⁶

However, these commandments elicited negative reactions even among some Nationalists. Therefore, in 1933–1934, the OUN discussed the new version of the "Decalogue," which was finally adopted between 1934 and 1936. In it, the most odious sentences were edited: the words "the greatest crime" were replaced with "the most dangerous act," "guile" with "reckless struggle," and the phrase "enslavement of foreigners" was completely deleted.³⁷

The desire to create a "religion of nationalism" inevitably led to a conflict with the traditional religion – Christianity. "Nationalism requires faith in the nation, not in God,"³⁸ – wrote one of the OUN ideologists Dmytro Shtykalo. The Nationalists applied different strategies concerning Christianity: from attempts to discredit it as a religion of the weak in the spirit of Nietzschean criticism to destructive mimicry (filling religious symbolism with new, nationalistic content). However, in the case of the OUN, it more likely points to a tendency to create a "religion of nationalism" rather than a completed process.

Of course, it would be a mistake to believe that all members of the OUN cared about its ideology or at least knew it. The OUN activist Mykhailo Seleshko expressed the opinion of many in a letter to Mykhailo Kolodzynskyi in 1937:

I have no desire to run into ideological chats. I know what I want, and that is enough for me. I want the Ukrainian state, I want to create a strong Ukrainian army to beat the enemy, and then let the politicians do what they want.³⁹

The struggle for the Ukrainian state was the only “ideology” for many Nationalists.

Nationalists and conservatives

Ukrainian integral nationalists opposed not only the states that owned Ukrainian territories, and “enemy nations,” but political opponents within Ukrainian society, regarding Ukrainian communists, socialists and liberals as their greatest enemies. Their relations with conservatives were more complex. They shared some conservative doctrines, but to attract people with right-wing views, they had to push the traditional conservatives aside.

The Ukrainian conservative camp was represented by the Ukrainian Hetmanite and Catholic movements. Hetmanites (*het'mantsi*) were Ukrainian monarchists, supporters of Pavlo Skoropadskyi (1873–1945), Hetman of Ukraine in 1918 (nominally until his death). They had relative success in recruiting supporters among emigrés in Europe and especially in the United States and Canada. However, the monarchists failed to attract as many followers among the Ukrainians of Poland. Under conditions of discrimination against Ukrainians, the Hetmanites there lost the competition to the Nationalists. Ukrainian Catholic parties and organisations affiliated with the Greek-Catholic Church had greater support in Poland's Eastern Galicia. The Ukrainian Catholic Union and the Ukrainian Catholic People's Party (later known as the Ukrainian People's Renewal) were the most important among them in the 1930s. They operated under the care of, respectively, the Metropolitan of Halych Andrei Sheptytsky and the Bishop of Stanyslaviv Hryhorii Khomyshyn.

Dontsov's relationship with the conservative camp was especially complicated. Departing from the Hetmanites at the end of 1918, he increasingly attacked them and their main ideologist Viacheslav Lypynskyi. Like Marxist critics of Ukrainian conservatism, Dontsov accused the members of the Ukrainian Union of Agrarians-Statists⁴⁰ that they were guided not by national state ideals but by the class interests of the landed aristocracy for which they were willing to sacrifice Ukraine's independence. According to him, the aristocracy could come to power in Ukraine only like in France during the Bourbon Restoration: with the help of alien bayonets and for a short time only.⁴¹

The second Achilles' heel of the Agrarians-Statists' ideology in the eyes of Dontsov was the rejection of the role of "Napoleonism" or "Caesarism" in favour of legitimism. Legitimism was dangerous for Ukraine because, on its basis, the Russian Romanovs dynasty had far more grounds to claim power in Ukraine than Hetman Skoropadskyi's family. Dontsov agreed with Lypynskyi that forming a nation with a "conscious national soul" would require personification of the innate irrational national sentiment in the person of the ruler. However, such personification could not be provided by a "legitimate monarch" who did not exist in Ukraine, but by a dictator who would emerge from the revolution like Cromwell, Napoleon, Mussolini or Bohdan Khmelnytsky.⁴²

Despite this controversy, the sociopolitical doctrines of Lypynskyi and Dontsov contain many elements in common: the ruthless criticism of the Ukrainian leftist intelligentsia and its democratic views, authoritarianism, voluntarism, elitism, imperialism and messianism. In part, these common features can be explained by Lypynskyi's influence on Dontsov's conception of the social and political organisation of the nation.⁴³

Dontsov rejected not only the ideology of the Agrarians-Statists but also the conservatism of the Ukrainian Catholic camp, which he called "koltun conservatism" (from the word *koltun* (Polish plait), used figuratively in Poland and Eastern Galicia to denote an uneducated person with an old-fashioned mindset). He criticised the Galician conservatives for allegedly seeing greater danger in the West, namely in Western democracy, than in the Bolshevik East, for readiness even to form a close alliance with non-Bolshevik Russia, for demanding blind obedience to "authoritative national figures" and treating criticism as anarchy. Dontsov ironically dismissed the Catholic politicians' religiosity: "If people were allowed into paradise, depending on how many times they uttered the words 'God' and 'faith,' the conservatives would occupy the paradise parterre." However, this "pious exhibitionism" did not prevent "koltun conservatism" from using shameful methods to combat those who did not share their "Pharisee morality."⁴⁴

This did not mean that Dontsov was an enemy of conservatism in principle. To the "koltun" Ukrainian conservatism, he opposed active and militant English conservatism, which elevated honesty in life over ostentatious religiosity, respected freedom of religious beliefs and encouraged the free exchange of views, in particular between representatives of different generations. Dontsov regarded Winston Churchill, whom he deeply respected as a strong personality, as the exemplar of a true conservative.⁴⁵ It is worth noting, however, that while accusing his conservative opponents of suppressing the free exchange of views, Dontsov himself was extremely intolerant of dissent among the authors of his journal *Vistnyk*.⁴⁶

Criticising Ukrainian conservatism, Dontsov shared some of its concepts, including elitism and especially traditionalism. Some researchers of his works consider him an ideologue of conservatism. This is correct to some extent, provided

that Dontsov was an ideologue of “revolutionary conservatism,” or, in his own words, “right-wing revolutionism.” His ideology had much in common with the “conservative revolution” – ideological trend born in Germany, whose ideologues were Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, Carl Schmitt, Oswald Spengler, Edgar Julius Jung, Ernst Jünger and others.⁴⁷

In the 1930s and early 1940s, Dontsov most closely approached the ideological course of the “conservative revolution,” one of the defining features of which is contrasting the myth of a perfect past to the myth of a rational future. Like other “conservative revolutionaries,” he sought to return to the order that preceded the emergence of the “world subversion” (democracy, rationalism, liberalism, Freemasonry, socialism, cosmopolitanism, etc.).⁴⁸ Conservative Revolution, as Peter Osborne put it,

is a form of revolutionary *reaction*. It understands that what it would ‘conserve’ is already lost (if indeed it ever existed, which is doubtful), and hence it must be created anew. [...] The fact that the past in question is primarily imaginary is thus no impediment to its political force, but rather its very condition (myth).⁴⁹

According to the “conservative revolutionaries,” to overcome the ever-widening gulf between modernity and the ideal (imaginary) world of the Tradition, it was not conservatism and preservation of the old that were needed, but the all-encompassing revolution aimed in a direction opposite to the revolution of the Left.⁵⁰ Hence the oxymoron “Conservative Revolution.”

The ideology of Dontsov was exactly of this kind. He called for a return to the idealised world of the princely and Cossack-Hetmanian Ukrainian traditions, to a hierarchical social system and the rule of the caste of “better people.” As the gulf between modernity and those ideal times became ever-widening, it was possible to return to them only through a total national revolution. These ideas were most fully set out in his book *The Spirit of Our Olden Days*.⁵¹

The efforts of Dontsov and the OUN to create a “religion of nationalism” inevitably led to conflict not only with the Catholic political camp but also with the Greek-Catholic Church. The struggle between the Church and Nationalists for control of the symbolic universe of the Ukrainians reached its climax during the “Ukrainian Youth for Christ” festival, organised by the Church in 1933. In the eyes of young members of the OUN, participation in the celebration was equal to the recognition of the highest authority of the Church in identifying the key symbols around which the youth should unite. The Nationalists disagreed with this, so the OUN Regional Executive decided to boycott the event. The purpose of the boycott was formulated quite frankly: “We will not give up possession of the young people’s souls to anyone!”⁵²

Commenting on the resolutions of the Nationalist students’ meeting on the attitudes to the festival, the Catholic newspaper *Meta* noted that they

coincided with the kind of nationalism called ‘integral.’ [...] As is well known, it is nationalism that makes its attitude to any religion dependent on whether or not this religion obeys nationalist principles. From the Catholic Church’s point of view, this is a certain heresy.⁵³

Thus, *Meta* saw the causes of the conflict in the incompatibility of integral nationalism (but not nationalism in general) with the teaching of the Church.

However, the boycott failed because of the traditional religiosity of Ukrainian rural youth in Galicia. According to different estimates, from 40,000 to 100,000 young people participated in the festival “Ukrainian Youth for Christ” in Lviv. The Church used the festival for the creation of the Catholic Action of Ukrainian Youth, reorganised in 1936 into the Catholic Association of Ukrainian Youth “Eagles” which had about 5,000 members in 1939.⁵⁴

After the “Ukrainian Youth for Christ” festival, the confrontation between the Nationalist and Catholic camps resulted in a heated debate in the press. Catholic conservatives saw the greatest danger of integral nationalism in its tendency to turn into a political religion that would displace Christianity. As a rule, they did not reject nationalism as a whole, opposing Christian, or Catholic, nationalism with the allegedly atheistic nationalism of Dontsov’s young followers. However, some representatives of both camps sought compromise, considering the union of Catholicism and nationalism as possible and desirable. On the part of the Church, this idea was most consistently presented by Fr. Mykola Konrad, professor at the Lviv Theological Academy, in his pamphlet *Nationalism and Catholicism* (1934).⁵⁵

Like other Catholic ideologists, Konrad opposed nationalism “in the older sense,” which was in agreement with Catholic ethics, to “modern nationalism,” which, so far, was not.⁵⁶ At the same time, he condemned such features of pre-world war nationalism as “exaggerated national egoism (chauvinism),” “spirit of imperialism,” and the desire to conquer foreign territories and assimilate other peoples. Konrad argued that “Ukrainian modern nationalism” (but not Ukrainian nationalism “in the older sense”) belongs to the same kind of movements as Italian Fascism and German National Socialism.

Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe presents Fr. Konrad as a great admirer of Dontsov and his concept of “amorality”:

Dontsov was for Konrad not only a thinker who applied Nietzsche’s theory to the Ukrainian reality, but also an intellectual who was as great as the eccentric German philosopher. The Lviv theologian praised the leading Ukrainian ideologist of fascism for his uncompromising, aggressive, and stirring writings [...]. Similarly, Konrad admired Dontsov’s concept of amorality and agreed that the nation is a living organism.⁵⁷

However, if one does not take quotations out of context and reads Konrad’s brochure carefully, it becomes clear that, although the theologian retold Dontsov’s

views, he did not admire him at all but rather considered him an ideological enemy. The priest hardly could agree with Dontsov's morality that was "alien to the concepts of justice and love for one's neighbour" and his "nationalist mentality" that "clearly condemns Christianity, led by Jesus Christ, and treats it with hostility."⁵⁸ How far Konrad was from "admiration" for Dontsov is evident from his rhetoric question: "Are the principles that Mr. Dontsov presents in his *Nationalism* ... not poisoned by the spirit of the most villainous zoological materialism?"⁵⁹ Konrad's goal was quite clear: to pull Ukrainian modern nationalism out of Dontsov's influence and to encourage it to ally with Catholicism. Konrad called for a joint crusade of nationalism and Catholicism against liberalism and socialism, "the rotten spirit of capitalism and Satanic communism." However, the union of "the cross and the sword" would be possible only if nationalism purified itself from Nietzschean atheist perversions, and recognised the authority of the Church.⁶⁰

Two years later, the member of the OUN Regional Executive, Dmytro Shtykalo, responded to Fr. Konrad in the pamphlet *The Cross of the Sword Shines Over the World*. Shtykalo argued that "no tone of the Christian religion is completely alien to the religion of modern nationalism," and therefore the Nationalists do not need to adapt their worldview to the requirements of the church. On the contrary, the church must adapt to nationalism and find common ground with it. An alliance between them is possible "on one condition: that the church will consciously seek to bring itself closer to nationalism." To prove the possibility of such an approach, Shtykalo rethought the main Christian symbols in the nationalist spirit. Even Jesus Christ appears in his pamphlet as a warlike and uncompromising leader, moreover – a nationalist leader who puts the good of his people above all else. Shtykalo was willing to admit the Christian religion, but only to the extent it does not contradict the "religion of nationalism": "The religion of nationalism can have nothing against the possibility that its professors (nationalists) recognise the dogmas of another religion as far as these alien dogmas harmonise and coincide with its own dogmas."⁶¹ As a result, Nationalist Shtykalo, like theologian Konrad, comes to the need for a synthesis of Christianity and nationalism, the symbol of which will be "the cross of the sword": "Cross and sword – symbols of church and nation! The cross is the sword, the sword is the cross! The cross of the sword is the harmony and synthesis of Christianity and nationalism!"⁶² For all the similarities of the rhetorics of Konrad and Shtykalo there was an important difference between them: for Konrad, in the union of the cross and the sword the former was superior, and for Shtykalo – the latter.

In general, the Ukrainian conservative, in particular the Catholic, camp had taken a negative view of integral nationalism, and especially of Dontsov's version because its particular morality was incompatible, according to critics, with Christian ethics. The greatest concern for the Church and Catholic politicians was the tendency to transform nationalism into a secular religion, which threatened to reject or absorb traditional Christianity. Therefore, the main motive for

Catholic criticism of “neo-nationalism” was the condemnation of the “neo-pagan” deification of a nation and the nationalist ethic independent of Christianity.

Another common motive was the rejection of immoral methods of political activity, in particular terrorism, to which members of the OUN attracted inexperienced youth. The Catholic conservatives were confident that the Ukrainians would have no chance to win state independence by an armed rebellion in the near future and that the realisation of the OUN’s concept of a “permanent revolution” would provoke only permanent repressions by the authorities. They advocated a legal way of protecting the national interests of Galician Ukrainians within the political system of Poland and sought opportunities for ethnic reconciliation of Poles and Ukrainians.

However, there were significant differences within this common platform. The followers of Bishop Hryhoriy Khomyshyn underlined their loyalty to the Polish authorities, the absence of any separatist tendencies, and, accordingly, a ruthless critique of nationalism, and not only of the integral one. Instead, the Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky’s adherents combined Christian values with a moderate nationalism. They criticised only the radical form of nationalism, nevertheless, considering it a lesser evil than communism. Some of them went even further, believing that a union of Catholicism with “modern nationalism” against communism, socialism and liberalism was possible and desirable. One of the reasons for this was the myth of social palingenesis, an important component of both integral nationalism and political Catholicism. To the integral nationalists, it meant the rebirth or rather a new birth of the nation in a new order based on the domination of strong and healthy nations. To the Catholics, it meant a Christian rebirth of the person, society and nation through the restoration of the ideals of “noble medieval Catholicism” and the establishment of *pax Christi in Regno Christi*.⁶³

In the late 1930s, the sense of the inevitability of dangerous and fateful events contributed to the rapprochement of clergy and Catholic activists with the Nationalists. In 1939, the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs noted with alarm “the active involvement of the clergy in the nationalist movement and the conscious tendency to impart political manifestations to religious activities.”⁶⁴ However, the idea of an alliance between the Ukrainian Catholicism and radical nationalism was never fully realised.

The Nationalists had rivals in the Catholic camp, but not among Orthodox politicians, as there was no specifically Orthodox Ukrainian political movement. The OUN considered the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate, as detached from Ukrainian Orthodox Cossack tradition, but welcomed the idea of creating the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church independent of foreign patriarchates. The Constitution, drafted by Stsiborskyi in 1939, stated: “The Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church with the Patriarch in Kyiv and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church with the Metropolitan in Lviv are recognised as National Churches in

the State.” In the future, the Nationalists hoped to create a united Ukrainian national church.⁶⁵

In general, the Nationalists’ approach to the church had always been instrumental: the church was valuable not in itself, but as one of the pillars of the nation, and insofar as it did not limit the ideological monopoly of nationalism.

Ukrainian nationalism and fascism

Italian Fascism had a powerful influence on the Ukrainian Nationalist thought and, to a certain extent, political practice. This is not surprising: the movement and regime of Benito Mussolini aroused great interest around the world, spawned epigones and an intellectual fashion for Fascism. Ukrainians had their own reasons to be interested in Fascism. After their defeat in the War for Independence of 1917–1921, the Ukrainian nationalist movement was in deep crisis and looked for new directions. The “Fascist Revolution” in Italy seemed to point the way. Many Ukrainians saw in Fascism an example of a victorious nationalist movement that saved its country from the threat of communism, united the nation under a single strong leadership and gave a new impetus to its revival. As the Ukrainian Nationalists were faced with similar tasks, it is logical that Fascism became their model.

Dontsov’s ideology in the interwar period increasingly approached fascism. The pro-fascist tendencies in Dontsov’s writings became especially pronounced after 1933. He enthusiastically welcomed the victory of National Socialism in Germany, seeing it as a force capable of destroying Bolshevism by its own methods. He was convinced that Ukraine also needed fascism:

They ask: why do we need fascism? To dispel the dope of Drahomanovism⁶⁶ of the “love for all Slavs,” the dope of socialism, the dope of fraternity with all peoples in the II or III International, to exterminate Freemasonry, to destroy the servile Judeophilism of the “good-natured” people, who curse Hitler when he does not allow several Levenbergs to work as physicians or lawyers – and shyly keep silent when Trotskys physically exterminate millions of our peasantry.

Why fascism? To protect the society from the invasion of foreign ideas from the outside and from the inside, to carry out a selection, because only a select minority can lead the society.⁶⁷

As we can see, fascism meant for Dontsov the implementation of a primarily negative program – the purification of society from the “dope” of alien and harmful ideas. The only constructive element in this program was the selection of the elite that would lead society – the idea later developed in the *Spirit of Our Olden Days*.

In the 1930s, some direct borrowing from the arsenal of Italian Fascism was approved in the ideological discourse of the OUN, the most important of which

were the concepts of the corporate state and totalitarianism. To some extent, the OUN also imitated the organisational principles of hierarchy and leadership inherent in Fascism. The Fascists' symbols and rituals influenced the formation of OUN's "cult of heroism." However, adopting some ideas and methods of the Fascists, OUN members did not forget to emphasise the originality of Ukrainian nationalism, denying the fascist nature of the organisation.⁶⁸

The ambivalent attitude to fascism was also reflected in the OUN's reaction to attempts of creating the "Fascist International."⁶⁹ The OUN did not participate in the Montreux Fascist Conference (Fascist International Congress) in December 1934, but not because it did not want to. On the contrary, after the conference, a member of PUN, Volodymyr Martynets, reproached the OUN representative in Italy, Yevhen Onatskyi, that he had "failed to inform in time about the congress of 'universal fascism,' to which we should send someone as an observer."⁷⁰ In justification, Onatskyi wrote to Martynets:

As for the congress, I also found out about it after the fact for the reason that I stopped maintaining contact with those people, seeing that the idea of "universal fascism" has a very unfavourable attitude among us. Have you not decidedly opposed this kind of "universalism" in Rozbudova Natsii? And has my report at the Berlin conference (of the OUN in 1934 – O. Z.) not been met very sceptically?⁷¹

Onatskyi further noted that in any case, the OUN was unlikely to be able to participate in the congress, as Eugenio Coselschi, the director of the Action Committees for the Universality of Rome (CAUR), regarded the OUN as a terrorist organisation fighting Poland. In a letter to Onatskyi, the OUN leader Yevhen Konovalets approached the case pragmatically:

Regarding the inclusion of our Organisation into the so-called Universal Fascism, I doubt if we could officially implement it. In my opinion, only the nation states can officially participate in this action. Instead, I am in favour of trying to get closer to that action informally. [...] Certainly, it was a bad thing that you could not go to Montreux: there, on the spot, you could find out, on the one hand, whether there was anything you could do in this case, and on the other hand, you could make appropriate propaganda to our benefit. [...] In the end, I also have doubts whether we should be too involved in the action, at least until the policy of your neighbours (the Italian Fascists – O. Z.) toward the east in general and toward our problem, in particular, is finally clarified. So I doubt whether your neighbours would want to get in touch with us too much at the moment (obviously, I mean official ties).⁷²

Indeed, the "neighbours" did not want to get in touch with the OUN officially. Coselschi left Onatskyi's letter requesting a meeting unanswered, and the OUN had not established contact with the CAUR.⁷³

The German version of fascism – National Socialism – attracted the attention of the Ukrainian Nationalists in the autumn of 1930, when the NSDAP achieved its first major success in the Reichstag elections. Nazism was interesting to the OUN not only as a potential ally in the fight for a change of the international order but also as a successful example of revolutionary nationalism, so the OUN Regional Executive circulated among the members of the organisation a translation of some sections of Hitler's *My Struggle* called *The National-Socialist Movement*. In the foreword, the OUN regional leader Stepan Okhrymovych wrote that "*Mein Kampf* is a work of invaluable world value for every politician or public figure." At the same time, he expressed reservations about the racist component of Hitlerism:

The attempt, which is the concept of racism, to carry out the world peace through destroying all less valuable races by the victorious sword of the ruling people that would force the whole world to serve the higher culture... has the features of the same 'artificiality' and unnaturalness as Marx's idea.⁷⁴

The OUN leaders were well aware of the attitude of the Nazis to the Slavs as a lower race, and of Hitler's aggressive intentions to gain "living space" for the Germans in the east, but saw no way out for the Ukrainians, except for an alliance with Germany, the single state capable of destroying the status quo in Europe. They knew that the Nazis respected only power, and hoped that Hitler would reckon with the Ukrainian Nationalist movement if it shows its strength and determination. It seems that such calculations determined the actions of the OUN led by Stepan Bandera in 1941, including the proclamation of the Ukrainian State.

Was Ukrainian integral nationalism a form of fascism? There can be no definitive answer to this question. In principle, both interpretations of Ukrainian integral nationalism – as a variety of fascism or as a non-fascist radical Right – are possible. The question is not which of them is "correct," but which of them has greater heuristic value. Both Dontsov's "active nationalism" and OUN's "organised nationalism" meet some influential definitions of fascism.⁷⁵ Undoubtedly, at the heart of the political mythology of both was the myth of national palingenesis, which Roger Griffin considers to be a core element of fascism.⁷⁶ Like fascists, Dontsov and the OUN sought to create not just a new ideology, but a political religion. Some features of Dontsov's ideology – antisemitism, the theory of racial inequality and the superiority of the Nordic race, and traditionalism – brought him closer (especially since the late 1930s) to German National Socialism than to Italian Fascism.

However, there were significant differences. According to Stanley Payne, the goal of fascism is to create "a new nationalist authoritarian state not based on traditional principles or models."⁷⁷ Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany fall under this definition, but this cannot be said about the future nationalist state, as Dontsov imagined it. The author of *Nationalism* vacillated between the various models

available, from American presidential democracy to “Napoleonism,” and from the late 1930s called for a return to the traditional order of princely and Cossack Ukraine. However, the tradition he wanted to revive was invented rather than genuine. Dontsov did not attach much importance to the state system; he was more interested in the general principles of hierarchical social order. Dontsov was even less interested in the future economic order, and never wrote in favour of a state-controlled economic system such as corporatism, national socialism or national syndicalism – on the contrary, he called for the fight against extreme statism. The main issue for Dontsov was the problem of ways to gain an independent state while for fascism, this problem did not exist (unless we consider the movement of the Croatian Ustašas before 1941 as a kind of fascism⁷⁸).

Despite the similarity of some themes and motives, Dontsov cannot be considered an ideologist of the Nazi style. Racism did not play as important a role in his outlook as it did in National Socialism. Dontsov’s antisemitism was not racist at its core. Rather, it was based on historical and economic arguments, in particular on accusing Jews of seeking to exploit Ukrainians economically, and most of all on the belief in the decisive role of Jewry as a mainstay of Russian and world communism. One cannot ignore the pragmatic considerations: if Dontsov wanted to connect the Ukrainian cause to Nazi Germany’s policy, peddling an antisemitic theme could only have helped. Dontsov belonged to the ultranationalist ideologues, whose palingenetic visions of a new society were close to fascism, but who did not attempt to become political activists to implement their ideas. Griffin considers such “literary fascists” (Giovanni Papini, Pierre Drieu de La Rochelle, Julius Evola and Alain Benoist) as proto-fascists in terms of their elitism and indirect impact on events.⁷⁹ In this sense, Dontsov, especially between 1933 and 1944, also could be classified as a proto-fascist.

The OUN, despite its authoritarian and revolutionary character, initially had no clear fascist features. However, the circumstances of the 1930s – the terror in Soviet Ukraine, the rise of authoritarianism and fascism in Europe, the intensification of repressions and fascist tendencies in Poland – contributed to the radicalisation and “fascistisation” of the Ukrainian Nationalist movement. People with democratic views lost influence or left the OUN. Mykola Stsiborskyi became the leading theorist of the future political order of Ukraine. *The Military Doctrine of Ukrainian Nationalists* by Mykhailo Kolodzynskyi⁸⁰ (1938) and the antisemitic journalism by Volodymyr Martynets⁸¹ became a clear testimony to the “fascistisation” of the part of the OUN at that time. The OUN was no exception to the rule in interwar Europe. Aristotle Kallis notes that the spread of fascist discourse and praxis in the 1920s and 1930s “resulted in a growing *fascistisation* of large sectors of the European conservative-authoritarian and nationalist-minded Right. More and more rightist groups started appearing, sounding, and acting like fascists.”⁸²

The ideology, organisational foundations and political style of the OUN were markedly influenced by fascism, especially Italian, and from 1929 to 1939 this influence steadily increased. The ideology and goals of the OUN were most

influenced by the fascist concepts of the corporate state and totalitarianism, the organisational principles – by the leader principle and model of hierarchical political organisation, the political style – by the cult of heroism and military virtues. Under the influence of National Socialism, antisemitic sentiment intensified in the Ukrainian Nationalist discourse in the late 1930s. Moreover, evolving within the framework of intellectual discourse shared with fascism, Ukrainian “organised nationalism” more or less independently developed traits that also brought them closer together: a voluntarist outlook, cultivating a pal-ingenic myth, a hostility to communism and “demoliberalism,” emphasising the conflict of the generations. However, just before the creation of the OUN, the Nationalist journalist Yevhen Onatskyi pointed out a fundamental difference between Ukrainian nationalism and fascism:

Many Ukrainian nationalists have enthusiastically begun to call themselves Ukrainian fascists and seek support from the Italian Fascists. They have not noticed that between Ukrainian nationalism and Italian Fascism yawns an impassable abyss that only time and tenacious effort can perhaps bridge. [...]

Fascism is the nationalism of a state nation that is hostile to all irredenta and ready to make any sacrifice to the cult of its own already created state.

Ukrainian nationalism is, on the contrary, the nationalism of a non-state nation that lives only by irredentism and is ready to make any sacrifice to destroy the cult of those states that do not allow it to live.⁸³

The distinction was even more clearly outlined in the editorial preface to the article “Fascism” by Professor Oleksandr Mytsiuk, in *Rozbudova Natsii*, in 1929:

For our part, we emphasise an irrelevance of the name “fascism,” by which Ukrainian nationalists have been branded by their opponents. Fascism is a movement of a state people, a trend, born on a social ground, which fought for power in its own state. Ukrainian nationalism is a national liberation movement with the task of a struggle for statehood, to which it ought to lead the broadest masses of the Ukrainian people. Therefore, Ukrainian nationalism not only cannot be identified with Italian Fascism but even cannot be compared to it.⁸⁴

Thus, copying some features of fascism, the Ukrainian Nationalists were aware of the differences that emerged from the stateless status of the Ukrainian people. The future state and social system was a minor problem for them compared to gaining independence.

I have never made a fetish from the state system, – wrote Dontsov in 1925. – This is a relative thing, which must be subordinated to the categorical

imperative of the nation's independence: it is not a good system that is good 'in principle,' but one that better secures independence.⁸⁵

Onatskyi in the letter to Konovalets in 1933 wrote similarly: "After all, we are indifferent to the form of the state. The main thing is its independence from foreigners. When our country is free, then the organised people will show their will."⁸⁶ This position distinguished integral nationalism in a stateless nation from fascism, for which the form of state was always a central issue.⁸⁷

The ultranationalist organisations of stateless peoples like the OUN and Ustaša constitute a separate genus of political movements and respective ideologies, different both from fascism and from the democratic trend in national liberation movements.⁸⁸ The Independent State of Croatia of 1941–1945 is a good model of what a Ukrainian state under the aegis of the Third Reich might have been like had the Nazis agreed to its creation. The Croatian experience shows that, under such conditions, proto-fascist integral nationalism soon turns into full-fledged fascism. By breaking up the Ukrainian government that the OUN had created in Lviv in 1941, the Nazis saved Ukrainian nationalism from such a fate. The Banderites' conflict with the Nazis gradually pushed them away from proto-fascist ultranationalism and toward a more democratic ideology, but this evolution was still incomplete when the Soviet regime finally suppressed the Ukrainian Nationalist underground in the early 1950s.

Conclusion

In the 1920s and 1930s, a significant part of the Ukrainian nationalist movement embraced an ideology of integral nationalism. Dmytro Dontsov's "active nationalism" and OUN's "organised nationalism" were the main Ukrainian varieties of this pan-European phenomenon. The differences between them were not about fundamental issues, but rather priorities: for Dontsov they were the cultivation of the nation's spontaneous will to life and power as well as the education of a new strong-willed Ukrainian man; for the OUN – a hierarchical disciplined organisation capable of revolutionising the nation and establishing a national dictatorship.

Ukrainian integral nationalism was a radical ideology of national liberation. Its main objectives were to overcome the conditions perceived as national oppression, and to establish an independent and powerful nation-state that would cover at least all ethnic Ukrainian lands and become a regional leader in Eastern Europe. The radicalism of this ideology and practice developed in the context of the tragic situation in which Ukrainian society found itself as a result of communist terror in the USSR, and discrimination in the Polish and Romanian states. This also created a favourable ground for the "fascistisation" of Ukrainian integral nationalism.

Like other ultranationalist movements in Europe (including the fascist ones), Ukrainian integral nationalists tended to sacralise the nation. They attempted

to create a political religion of nationalism that was to embrace the cult of a nation, Ukrainianised militant Christianity, as well as the main cultural and political symbols of Ukrainianness. Ukrainian integral nationalism created its own symbolic universe with a developed system of symbols, myths and rituals, at the core of which was a paligenetic myth – the myth of the nation’s rebirth or regeneration in a nationalist revolution and a new world order based on the domination of strong and healthy nations and races. However, due to some institutional and ideological obstacles, Ukrainian integral nationalism did not turn into a political religion to the same extent as Italian Fascism or German National Socialism, let alone Soviet Communism. The main obstacles were the absence of the national state, and the deep-rootedness of traditional religion in Western Ukrainian society.

The Ukrainian radical nationalists had a complicated relationship with the conservatives – the Hetmanites and Catholic political camp. The tendency towards a nationalist religion was strong enough to provoke sharp criticism from the Greek-Catholic Church. However, some Ukrainian Catholic activists felt that militant nationalism could play an important role in the fight against the main threat – communism. From this stemmed the idea of an alliance between Catholicism and radical nationalism in the common struggle with communism and other ideologies that were considered hostile to the Church and nation.

Ukrainian integral nationalism was strongly influenced by fascism. Although the Ukrainian Nationalists, with few exceptions, did not identify with fascism, clear parallels did exist between the two ideological movements. Considering Ukrainian integral nationalism as a variety of fascism is not without foundation (especially within the framework of the history of ideas). However, the fascist model has limited heuristic value for the Ukrainian case.

The following interpretation seems more appropriate: fascism (including Nazism) and the radical current of Ukrainian nationalism (along with other similar movements of non-state nations) belonged to different types of one social phenomenon – integral nationalism (ultranationalism). Fascism was a form of ultranationalism that arose in nation-states, and its energy was channelled into the totalitarian reorganisation of existing states and the subjugation of other nations. Ukrainian integral nationalism developed in the absence of own nation-state and was, above all, a radical national-liberation movement. Yet, its national-liberation character did not preclude its hybridisation with fascist models.

For Dontsov, his followers and the OUN, national liberation and independence were the main goals, while fascist ideas and methods were the tools to achieve them or preferable (but not exclusive) means of state-building after independence. During the 1930s, they experienced an intense “fascistisation,” which resulted in a hybrid ideology with a mixture of national-liberationist and fascist elements. The most appropriate designation for such an ideological movement is *proto-fascist integral nationalism in the absence of nation-state*.

Notes

- 1 Mykola Stsibors'kyi, *Natsiokratiia* (Paris; n.p., 1935), p. 58.
- 2 In this chapter, the word “Nationalist” is capitalised when related to the organised Ukrainian nationalist movement, especially the OUN.
- 3 See e.g. John–Paul Himka, “Debates in Ukraine over Nationalist Involvement in the Holocaust, 2004–2008,” *Nationalities Papers*, vol. 39, no. 3 (May 2011), pp. 353–370; Per Anders Rudling, *The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust: A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths* (Pittsburgh: Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 2011) (= *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies*, no. 2017); Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, *Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist: Fascism, Genocide, and Cult* (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2014); Rossoliński-Liebe, *The Fascist Kernel of Ukrainian Genocidal Nationalism* (Pittsburgh: Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 2015) (= *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies*, no. 2402).
- 4 See e.g. Volodymyr V'iatrovych, *Druha pol's'ko-ukrains'ka viina. 1942–1947* (Kyiv: Vydavnychiy dim “Kyievo-Mohylians'ka akademiia,” 2012); Ivan Patryliak, “*Vstan' i borys', slukhai i vir...*”: ukrains'ke natsionalistychne pidpillia ta povstans'kyi rukh (1939–1960 rr.) (Lviv: Chasopys, 2012); Serhii Kvit, *Dmytro Dontsov: ideolohichnyi portret* (Lviv: Halys'ka vydavnycha spilka, 2013).
- 5 For the survey of recent “memory wars” around Ukrainian nationalist movement of the 1940s, see Myroslav Shkandrij, *Revolutionary Ukraine, 1917–2017: History's Flash-points and Today's Memory Wars* (London: Routledge, 2020), pp. 112–131.
- 6 Alexander J. Motyl's monograph was one of the first to set up the discussion about Ukrainian nationalism between the two world wars in a scholarly way: Alexander J. Motyl, *The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929* (Boulder, CO and New York: Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1980) (= *East European Monographs*, no. 65). Among the recent publications, the works by Myroslav Shkandrij and Trevor Erlacher are especially worth mentioning: Myroslav Shkandrij, *Ukrainian Nationalism: Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929–1956* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015); Trevor Erlacher, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the Age of Extremes: An Intellectual Biography of Dmytro Dontsov* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 2020) (forthcoming).
- 7 The term was coined by the French royalist and leader of Action Française, Charles Maurras, in 1900: William Curt Buthman, *The Rise of Integral Nationalism in France: With Special Reference to the Ideas and Activities of Charles Maurras* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), p. 111.
- 8 In this chapter, I will not specifically address the FNU, which was of much less importance than the OUN or Dontsov with his followers.
- 9 On authoritarian nationalism and its different “faces,” see Stanley G. Payne, *A History of Fascism, 1914–1945* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), pp. 14–19.
- 10 Roger Griffin, “Introduction,” in Cyprian P. Blamires (ed.), with Paul Jackson, *World Fascism: A Historical Encyclopedia*, vol. 1: A–K (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2006), p. 2; see also Griffin, *Fascism: An Introduction to Comparative Fascist Studies* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018), pp. 41–45.
- 11 “Fascism is a term for a singularly protean genus of modern politics ... expressing itself ideologically in a revolutionary form of integral nationalism (ultra-nationalism)”: Roger Griffin, “Fascism,” in Griffin (ed.), *International Fascism: Theories, Causes and the New Consensus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 35–36.
- 12 Carlton J. H. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York: R. R. Smith, Inc., 1931), p. 165.
- 13 Peter Alter, *Nationalism*, 2nd ed. (London: Edward Arnold, 1994), p. 27.
- 14 John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 3rd. ed. (Englewood, CO: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1990); Armstrong, “Collaborationism in World War II: The

- Integral Nationalist Variant in Eastern Europe,” *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. 40, no. 3 (September 1968), pp. 396–410. See also Zeev Sternhell, *The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Aviel Roshwald, *Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia and the Middle East, 1914–1923* (London: Routledge, 2001).
- 15 For overviews of the development of the Ukrainian national movement in Austria-Hungary and the Russian Empire before and during the First World War, see Motyl, *The Turn to the Right*, pp. 5–22; Paul R. Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples*, 2nd ed. (Toronto, ON; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2010), Chapters 30, 35–37; Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine* (New York: Basic Books, 2015), Chapters 17–18.
 - 16 Marc Bloch, *The Historian’s Craft*, translated from the French by Peter Putnam (New York: Knopf, 1954), p. 29.
 - 17 Motyl, *The Turn to the Right*, p. 169.
 - 18 Quoted in Alter, *Nationalism*, p. 32.
 - 19 See Christopher Gilley, *The “Change of Signposts” in the Ukrainian Emigration: A Contribution to the History of Sovietophilism in the 1920s* (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2014).
 - 20 Grzegorz Motyka, *Od rzezi wołyńskiej do akcji “Wisła.” Konflikt polsko-ukraiński 1943–1947* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2011), p. 36.
 - 21 Motyka, *Od rzezi wołyńskiej do akcji “Wisła.”* p. 36.
 - 22 Dmytro Dontsov, *Natsionalizm* (Lviv, 1926).
 - 23 See e.g. Oleh Bahan, “Dzherela svitohliadnoho natsionalizmu Dmytra Dontsova,” in Dmytro Dontsov, *Vybrani tvory u desiaty tomakh*, vol. 1 (Drohobych: Vidrozhennia, 2011), p. 12.
 - 24 Roman Wysocki, *W kręgu nacjonalizmu integralnego. Czynniki nacjonalizmu Dmytra Doncowa na tle myśli nowoczesnych Romana Dmowskiego: studium porównawcze* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2014), p. 459.
 - 25 Trevor Erlacher, *The Furies of Nationalism: Dmytro Dontsov, the Ukrainian Idea, and Europe’s Twentieth Century: A dissertation ... of Doctor of Philosophy...* (Chapel Hill, NC: ProQuest LLC, 2017), p. 34.
 - 26 Dmytro Dontsov, *Pidstavy nashoi polityky* (Viden: Vydavnytstvo Dontsovykh, 1921).
 - 27 On Lypynskyi and his ideology, see Alexander J. Motyl, “Viacheslav Lypynskyi and the Ideology and Politics of Ukrainian Monarchism,” *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, vol. 27, no. 1 (1985), pp. 31–48.
 - 28 Stepan Lenkav’skyi, *Ukrains’kyi natsionalizm: Tvory*, vol. 1 (Ivano-Frankiv’sk: Lileia-NV, 2002), p. 70.
 - 29 Dariia Rebet, *Sphady* (Lviv: Manuskrypt-Lviv, 2018), p. 74.
 - 30 Quoted in Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky, “Nationalism,” in Danylo Husar Struk (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 3 (Toronto, ON and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1993), p. 553.
 - 31 Stsibors’kyi, *Natsiokratia* (especially Chapter VI).
 - 32 “Permanentna revoliutsiia,” in Viktor Roh (upor.), *Ukrains’kyi natsionalizm: Antolohiia*, 2nd ed., vol. 1 (Kyiv: FOP Stebeliak O. M., 2010), pp. 99–112.
 - 33 Roman Wysocki, *Organizacja Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów w Polsce w latach 1929–1939: geneza, struktura, program, ideologia* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2003), p. 337.
 - 34 Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie, Ministerstwo Spraw Zewnętrznych, 2347, p. 72.
 - 35 Quoted in Marko Carynnyk, “Foes of Our Rebirth: Ukrainian Nationalist Discussions about Jews, 1929–1947,” *Nationalities Papers*, vol. 39, no. 3 (May 2011), p. 320.
 - 36 Quoted in Lenkav’skyi, *Ukrains’kyi natsionalizm*, vol. 1, p. 458.
 - 37 Petro Mirchuk, *Narys istorii OUN: 1920–1939 roky*, 3rd ed. (Kyiv: Ukrains’ka vydavnycha spilka, 2007), pp. 106, 125–126; Lenkav’skyi, *Ukrains’kyi natsionalizm*, vol. 1, pp. 454–458.

- 38 Dmytro Shtykalo, *Nad svitom siaie khrest mecha* (Lviv: Nakladom Olhy Hrozov's'koi, 1936), p. 43.
- 39 *Arkhiv OUN u Kyievi*, f. 1, op. 1, spr. 93, ark. 114.
- 40 Ukrainian Union of Agrarians-Statists (*Ukrains'kyi Soiuz Khlitborobiv Derzhavnykiv*, or USKHD) – a conservative émigré monarchist organisation founded in Vienna in 1920 by Viacheslav Lypynskyi.
- 41 D. D[ontsov], “Pans'ko-muzhyts'kyi tsentavr i neomonarkhizm,” *Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk*, vol. 86, no. 4 (April 1925), pp. 357–359.
- 42 D. D[ontsov], “Pans'ko-muzhyts'kyi tsentavr i neomonarkhizm,” pp. 362–365.
- 43 We can agree with Mykhailo Sosnovskyi that Dontsov's ideas were based on the ideas of Lypynskyi (interpreted in integral-nationalist spirit): Mykhailo Sosnov's'kyi, *Dmytro Dontsov: politychnyi portret. Z istorii rozvytku ideolohii ukrains'koho natsionalizmu* (New York; Toronto: Trident International, 1974), p. 301.
- 44 Dmytro Dontsov, “Koltuns'kyi konservatyzm (Vidpovid' zhyvym trupam),” *Vistnyk*, vol. 1, no. 3 (March 1933), pp. 222–230.
- 45 Dontsov, “Koltuns'kyi konservatyzm,” pp. 222, 225–226.
- 46 See details in Oleksandr Zaitsev, *Natsionalist u dobi fashyzmu: Lvivs'kyi period Dmytra Dontsova, 1922–1939 roky: Nacherk intelektual'noi biohrafiï* (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2019), pp. 247, 255–263, 270–272.
- 47 See Roger Woods, *The Conservative Revolution in the Weimar Republic* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); Martin Travers, *Critics of Modernity: The Literature of the Conservative Revolution in Germany, 1890–1933* (New York: Peter Lang, 2001) (= *German Life and Civilization*, vol. 35).
- 48 See Julius Evola, *Men among the Ruins: Post-war Reflections of a Radical Traditionalist*, translated by G. Stucco (Rochester, Vermont: Inner Tradition, 2002).
- 49 Peter Osborne, *The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde* (New York: Verso, 1995), p. 164. Contrary to other scholars, such as Richard Wolin, who conflate the ideology of the conservative revolution with “the entrenched antimodernism of the German mandarin intelligentsia,” Osborne views it as a manifestation of *reactionary modernism*: Osborne, *The Politics of Time*; see Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 23. See also Jeffrey Herf, *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
- 50 Aleksandr Dugin, *Konservativnaia revoliutsiia* (Moskva: Arktoheia, 1994), p. 11.
- 51 Dmytro Dontsov, *Dukh nashoi davnyiny* (Praha: Vydavnytstvo Yu. Tyshchenka, 1944).
- 52 O. Vitkov's'kyi, “Volodinnia nad dushamy molodi nikomu ne vidstupymo! Z pryvodu rezoliutsii Vsestudents'koi Ankety v spravi sviata ‘Ukrains'ka Molod' Khrystovi’,” *Nash Klych*, 9 April 1933, pp. 1–2.
- 53 “Borot'ba z neistnuuiuchymy nebezpekamy. Z pryvodu rezoliutsii students'koi ankety,” *Meta*, 26 March 1933, p. 1.
- 54 Oleksandr Zaitsev, Oleh Behen, Vasyl Stefaniv, *Natsionalizm i relihiia: Hreko-Katolyts'ka Tserkva ta ukrains'kyi natsionalistychnyi rukh u Halychyni (1920–1930-ti roky)* (Lviv: Vydavnytstvo Ukrains'koho Katolyts'koho Universytetu, 2011), pp. 275, 284; V. I. Pryluts'kyi, “Orly,” *Entsyklopediia istorii Ukrainy*, edited by V. A. Smolii et al., vol. 7 (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 2010), p. 635.
- 55 Mykola Konrad, *Natsionalizm i Katolytyzym* (Ivano-Frankiv's'k: Hran', 2003). Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe commented the pamphlet in detail but, unfortunately, presented the views of Fr. Konrad in a distorted light. See Rossoliński-Liebe, *The Fascist Kernel of Ukrainian Genocidal Nationalism*, pp. 31–34.
- 56 This opposition has completely disappeared in Rossoliński-Liebe's account.
- 57 Rossoliński-Liebe, *The Fascist Kernel of Ukrainian Genocidal Nationalism*, p. 33.
- 58 Konrad, *Natsionalizm i Katolytyzym*, p. 21.
- 59 Konrad, *Natsionalizm i Katolytyzym*, pp. 29–30.

- 60 Konrad, *Natsionalizm i Katolytyzm*, pp. 24–37.
- 61 Shtykalo, *Nad svitom siaie khrest mecha*, pp. 25, 43.
- 62 Shtykalo, *Nad svitom siaie khrest mecha*, p. 47.
- 63 See Oleksandr Zaitsev, “Ukrainian Integral Nationalism and the Greek-Catholic Church in 1920–30s,” in Jan Nelis, Anne Morelli and Danny Praet (eds.), *Catholicism and Fascism in Europe, 1918–1945* (Hildesheim, Zurich and New York: George Olms Verlag, 2015), pp. 389–401.
- 64 Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie, Ambasada RP w Berlinie, 3935, p. 129.
- 65 Volodymyr Muravs’kyi (ed.), *Kongres Ukrains’kykh Natsionalistiv 1929 r.: Dokumenty i materialy* (Lviv: LNB im. V. Stefanyka; Tsentr doslidzhen’ vyzvol’noho rukhu, 2006), pp. 195–197, 291; Oleksandr Kucheruk and Yurii Cherchenko (eds.), *Dokumenty i materialy z istorii Orhanizatsii Ukrains’kykh Natsionalistiv*, vol. 7, (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo imeni Oleny Telihy, 2002), p. 9.
- 66 From Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841–1895), a Ukrainian socialist thinker.
- 67 Dmytro Dontsov, “Vony i my,” *Vistnyk*, vol. 4, no. 5 (May 1936), p. 382.
- 68 See Oleksandr Zaitsev, *Ukrains’kyi integral’nyi natsionalizm (1920–1930-ti roky): Narysy intelektual’noi istorii* (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2013), pp. 308–326.
- 69 See Michael Arthur Leeden, *Universal Fascism: The Theory and Practice of the Fascist International, 1928–1936* (New York: H. Fertig, 1972).
- 70 Shevchenko Scientific Society Archives, Ievhen Onats’kyi Papers, box 1, folder 8 (Diaries, 1936), p. 47.
- 71 Shevchenko Scientific Society Archives, Ievhen Onats’kyi Papers, box 1, folder 8 (Diaries, 1936), p. 47.
- 72 Shevchenko Scientific Society Archives, Ievhen Onats’kyi Papers, box 1, folder 8 (Diaries, 1936), p. 53.
- 73 Shevchenko Scientific Society Archives, Ievhen Onats’kyi Papers, box 1, folder 8 (Diaries, 1936), p. 60.
- 74 Tsentral’nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchych orhaniv vlady ta upravlinnia Ukrainy, f. 3833, op. 2, spr. 40, ark. 3.
- 75 See e.g. Stanley G. Payne, “Fascism and Racism,” in Terence Ball and Richard Bellamy (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), Chapter 5, p. 124; Griffin, “Introduction,” p. 2; Robert O. Paxton, “Comparisons and Definitions” in R. J. B. Bosworth (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Fascism* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), Chapter 29, p. 549.
- 76 Roger Griffin, “Palingenetic myth,” in Cyprian P. Blamires (ed.), with Paul Jackson, *World Fascism: A Historical Encyclopedia*, vol. 2: L–Z (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2006), pp. 498–499; Griffin, *Fascism*, pp. 40–41, 46.
- 77 Payne, *A History of Fascism*, p. 7.
- 78 There are two main views on the essence of the Ustašas’ ideology in historiography. Some historians interpret the Ustaša–Croatian Revolutionary Movement as Croatian fascism or clerical fascism. Other scholars question the fascist nature of the organisation. In their view, the *ustaštvo* was a radical nationalist movement, and its ideology was Croatian ethnic nationalism. I share the view that until 1941 the Ustaša was rather a proto-fascist movement, which turned into full-fledged fascism only with the creation of the Independent State of Croatia when the problem of gaining own state was replaced by the problem of the foundations on which it was to be built. For different interpretations, see Srdja Trifkovic, *Ustaša: Croatian Separatism and European Politics, 1929–1945* (London: Lord Byron Foundation for Balkan Studies, 1998); Sergei Beliakov, *Ustashi: mezhdū fashizmom i etnicheskim natsionalizmom* (Moskva: Gumanitarnyi universitet, 2009); Rory Yeomans, *Visions of Annihilation: The Ustasha Regime and the Cultural Politics of Fascism, 1941–1945* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013).
- 79 Roger Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism* (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 51.

- 80 Mykhailo Kolodzynskiy, *Voienna doktryna ukrains'kykh natsionalistiv* (Kyiv: TOV "Osnova," 2019).
- 81 See e.g. Volodymyr Martynets', "Zhydivs'ka problema v Ukraini," in *Ideia v nastupi: Almanakh* (London: n.p., 1938), pp. 24–47.
- 82 Aristotle Kallis, *Genocide and Fascism: The Eliminationist Drive in Fascist Europe* (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 122.
- 83 Evhen Onats'kyi, "Lysty z Italii. I. Deshcho pro fashyzm," *Rozbudova Natsii*, vol. 1, no. 3 (March 1928), p. 95.
- 84 Oleksandr Mytsiuk, "Fashyzm," *Rozbudova Natsii*, vol. 2, no. 7–8 (August–September 1929), p. 262.
- 85 D. D[ontsov], "Pans'ko-muzhyts'kyi tsentavr i neomonarkhizm," p. 360.
- 86 Yevhen Onats'kyi, *U Vichnomu misti: Zapytsky ukrains'koho zhurnalista*, vol. 3: 1933 rik (Toronto, ON: Novyi shliakh, 1985), p. 200.
- 87 It is no accident, that director of CAUR, listing fundamental points of the universal fascist doctrine, put on the first place "*the reconstitution of a State on new bases*" (quoted in Leeden, *Universal Fascism*, p. 117).
- 88 In some of my works, I used for them the term *ustashism* (from the Croatian Ustaša), which can be defined as revolutionary integral nationalism developing under conditions of perceived foreign oppression and using violence for national liberation and for creating an independent authoritarian state. I do not insist on this term, but I use it because there is no other special term in historiography and political science for the designation of this type of movements. See Oleksandr Zaitsev, "Fascism or ustashism? Ukrainian Integral Nationalism in Comparative Perspective, 1920s–1930s," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, vol. 48, no. 2–3 (2015), pp. 183–193. For the critique of my argument, see Tomislav Dulić, Goran Miljan, "The Ustašas and Fascism: 'Abolitionism,' Revolution, and Ideology (1929–42)," *Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society*, vol. 6, no. 1 (2020), pp. 277–306.