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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of my admission to the LvBS' Technology Management program was to launch my own startup in data warehouse management. Therefore, one of the most anticipated modules was the Technological Entrepreneurship module with Denis Dovgopoly.

During my everyday work in a digital agency, I create strategies of digital presence, web sites, determine the target audience, select promotion channels, work with the audience and its feedback, analyze ad campaigns. So at the Technology Management program, I wanted to stay on the backside of startups and go through all the stages by myself.

Applying the knowledge of the methodology I was taught, I made an analysis and realized that although my startup solves the problem of data warehouse management for some clients. But also I learned about platform risks because in the middle of my work on it I found plans of Google to make our main feature free for all their customers in the near future. It was the end of my project and the end of my possible thesis work.

Therefore, when I found out that Denis Dovgopoly founded a startup "Unicorn Nest" that will help other startups look for investments, I decided to join it as an advisor and took the opportunity to change focus quickly and apply the knowledge gained during training at the LvBS.

I took on some of the marketing tasks of "Unicorn Nest". But due to the fact the working team of the startup was not big and mainly contained data scientist, I managed to take part not only in marketing but also in the management of startup. I was able to apply a range of useful management practices, analytical methods, and design extra features for customers. I realized that I need to look at the problems of startups more widely.

Work with "Unicorn Nest" provides an opportunity for a better perception of the problems startups founders have faced in a process. That's why I eliminated the illusion about startup issues and tried to avoid them, using the knowledge from the Technology Management program.

The goal of the research is to build a systematic process of collecting data and supporting decision making with meaningful insights. It is focused on the integration of all the information that a "Unicorn Nest" receives in the early days. It has already had an impact on strategic decisions made in Unicorn Nest and models of the research helped not only change current strategy but also helped convince investors to support these changes.

CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND

1.1 Opportunity overview

With this research paper, we make a deep understanding of difficulties that attend at every stage of interaction in startup-investor relationships. Fundraising is a complicated, continuous, exhausting, and expensive process for startups. It requires so much time and additional skills from the team and founder. And the greatest contradiction of fundraising is that the founder's core competence is to build a business, not to raise funds. Despite the huge amount of effort applied to the obtaining of investments, nearly 80% of startups never raise a second round of investment.


Nevertheless, fundraising is crucial for startup success. Startups usually have limited resources, some specialists may combine several functions, often there is an abnormal work schedule due to hard deadlines, and the desire to get the result as quickly as possible. We also can not overlook the necessity to keep the focus on product quality, balancing between the desire to make it perfect, market realities and the need to launch the product as soon as possible to receive first feedback. So every day they spend on the fundraising process moves their focus from the product in one way or another.

Most famous VC's are overloaded by the deal flow. One more challenging problem which arises in this domain is the reporting system for VC's that eat a lot of resources in the due diligence process. All these issues lead to inefficiency in the fundraising process for founders and funds, and therefore to a further obstacle to the release of the product.

While there is no research on the fundraising process, it turns out to be even more problematic to see the skyline of the fundraising issues. We found few different cases when startups published their leads to responses, responses to term sheets, term sheets to deals, but these numbers were incomplete, some of them were published a few years ago, and we supposed that some of them were flimsy. So our own investigations were necessary to validate the kinds of conclusions that can be drawn from this research.

To confirm or disprove these numbers, we ran our own research. We asked startup founders, and on the other side venture funds representatives, to analyze their statistics. They went through their mail and shared their numbers with us to illuminate this uncharted area.

On average for pre-seed, a+ startup stages, fundraising takes more than 600 hours



from the startup team. From that 600 hours, 150 hours are usually spent on finding funds that potentially invest in startups from your vertical, geo, stage, e.t.c. These 150 hours convert in 300-500 funds lists for each of them. You need to find a relevant person in this fund and their email or LinkedIn profile to reach them. These 300-500 outbound emails usually convert in 3-5 term sheets received by a startup.

Depending on the startup focus market, founders network, etc, this time costs could be more or less. But it is still a huge amount of resources that founders could spend on product development, marketing, team development, etc.

As paradoxical as it may be another obstacle every startup founder is frightened of is the success of the fundraising process. The second stage turns out to be even more problematic because statistically only 20% of startups that received a seed round get Around. For the seed stage, the success rate is even lower. While the reason for this

lies mostly in startup willingness, founders' perception shifted to finding the right investors for their brilliant project.

Also, most popular funds startups are trying to reach are overwhelmed with the flow of emails with applications for potential projects. Consequently, as we can guess, the chances of a founder to get the attention of "Sequoia" or "AZ" fund is low. This unpleasant revelation makes a suitable list of less popular funds valuable to startup founders.

So the general aim of my research paper is to develop more sophisticated methods and tools that can give startup founders a chance to focus their entrepreneurial zeal on a product. Because it will help to save at least 150 hours on making a preliminary stage with:


- outbound email lists
- possibly make this list more relevant
- rising open rate
- rising response rate

There is a clear advantage in the following methods that's why we assume that founders would be ready to pay for our tool.

1.2 Solution overview

"Unicorn Nest" is a SaaS company that suggests the most relevant investors from the comprehensive, verified and constantly updated database for startups looking to

raise seed, series A, and B. We score funds on 70+ parameters (founding date, # of



UNICORN NEST

Your search results

Investment Stage: Seed Industry: Sex Tech HQ Location: Kyiv Ukraine MRR: Below \$15,000
Planned Round Size: Below \$2 millions

New search

249 matching investors found

Showing 20 results out of 249

 Export Spreadsheet

You will download the spreadsheet with the funds and their decision makers

deals, # of exits, # of unicorns), Geo (geo of funds, geo of the portfolio, geo of birth, study, work), MRR, market, business model and many more. Based on information about the fund, deals, persons in these funds we can provide startups with a list of relevant investors and contact information of key personas.

One of the most important benefits of our approach is that it can perform algorithms that can reveal “invisible” investors in our database that didn’t publicly invest in the targeted industry or geo, but potential can be relevant to this particular startup. By “invisible” investors we mean investors that not publicly invest in this geo, market, or business model but by indirect hints can invest in this particular startup.

For example, the approach to solve this problem involves the use of comparing the graduation of key personas in the fund and comparing it with the geo of the startup. This indirect connection we find in many deals in our database. This delivers significantly better results and we are sure that the value of this feature will be estimable for startup founders.

Also Unicorn Nest helps startups to find “hidden” investors. “Hidden” means that these funds are located below 1000th position of Crunchbase list of top investors

Table 1 - hidden investors

Seed stage	“A” stage	“A+B” stages
85% of funds are hidden	98% of funds are hidden	79% of funds are hidden

The advantage of Unicorn Nest is a fundamental understanding of the conditions under which the possibility of attracting investment for a particular project is quite high. Based on this knowledge, we can direct the entrepreneur to the right investor. The conclusions to settle down our conclusions are based on a deep understanding of the needs of investors in our database.

The main disadvantage of the approach used in the current environment lies in the exploration of the necessary contacts and receiving just scraps of information you can find from different kinds of resources. For creating a list of funds you can use CrunchBase or other services, but the foremost problems are the fact that they all don’t provide contact information on key personas emails due to GDPR.

K	L	M	N
Domain for Email Generating	TOP1 Username for Email Generating	TOP2 Username for Email Generating	TOP3 Username for Email Generating
plugandplaytechcenter.com	first	first last	first last_initial
plugandplaytechcenter.com	first	first last	first last_initial
plugandplaytechcenter.com	first	first last	first last_initial
plugandplaytechcenter.com	first	first last	first last_initial
plugandplaytechcenter.com	first	first last	first last_initial
plugandplaytechcenter.com	first	first last	first last_initial
taventures.vc	first '' last	last	first last_initial
taventures.vc	first '' last	last	
taventures.vc	first '' last	last	
bdc.ca	first '' last	last	first '' last
bdc.ca	first '' last	last	first '' last
bdc.ca	first '' last	last	first '' last
bdc.ca	first '' last	last	first '' last
bdc.ca	first '' last	last	first '' last
bdc.ca	first '' last	last	first '' last
bdc.ca	first '' last	last	first '' last
bdc.ca	first '' last	last	first '' last
bdc.ca	first '' last	last	first '' last
bdc.ca	first '' last	last	first '' last
bdc.ca	first '' last	last	first '' last
bdc.ca	first '' last	last	first '' last
bdc.ca	first '' last	last	first '' last
bdc.ca	first '' last	last	first '' last
bdc.ca	first '' last	last	first '' last
bdc.ca	first '' last	last	first '' last
bdc.ca	first '' last	last	first '' last
bdc.ca	first '' last	last	first '' last
bdc.ca	first '' last	last	first '' last
bdc.ca	first '' last	last	first '' last
bdc.ca	first '' last	last	first '' last
bdc.ca	first '' last	last	first '' last
bdc.ca	first '' last	last	first '' last
bdc.ca	first '' last	last	first '' last
kaporcapital.com	first	first_initial last	last
kaporcapital.com	first	first_initial last	last
kaporcapital.com	first	first_initial last	last
kaporcapital.com	first	first_initial last	last
kimaventures.com	first	first '' last	first_initial last
kimaventures.com	first	first '' last	first_initial last
kimaventures.com	first	first '' last	first_initial last
kimaventures.com	first	first '' last	first_initial last
kimaventures.com	first	first '' last	first_initial last
kimaventures.com	first	first '' last	first_initial last
allianceofangels.com	first	first '' last	first_initial last
allianceofangels.com	first		

Therefore, the founder must dig through a large number of bits of information, on LinkedIn or somewhere else, to make a whole picture, and only after that verify it and start to connect with investors.

Also, we were able to get around one more complexity. We find a way to provide contact information without violating GDPR. Instead of providing a personal email, we implement a rule used in this fund corporate email. For example, if the email in this fund looks like `firstname.lastname@` we give this rule and first and last names of key personas.

So, with this feature getting one file for his search "Unicorn Nest" clients can generate an outbound email list and save near 150 hours of work while gets a better response rate from potential investors than using manual technic and LinkedIn messaging that usually have very low open and response rate.

The average open rate for business emails sits around 14% to 23% depending on the industry. Even personalized email with a good subject line still gets a very low open rate and even less response rate.

Gaining the right targeted contacts is the starting point for startup founders. Hence, our big purpose in Unicorn Nest is to resolve several problems at once: to save

time on searching, find the most appropriate investors, help a startup to be noticed with a minimum amount of resources wasted.


So a relevant email list can dramatically change the response rate for founders and not just saves time but also raises chances of success in closing deals.

It's an estimated 1 billion cold fundraising emails per year in the industry, while the average round size and the number of deals is growing each year. With our fair pay-as-you-go pricing model, Unicorn Nest significantly saves founders time having superior dataset precision and proprietary scoring and matching algorithms.

1.3 Market for the problem

To estimate the potential market, we made extensive research on competitors and available market research. As a result, we came up with the PAM TAM SAM SOM model that is usually used by startups.

Total Venture Capital Market is approximately \$340B in 34k deals (all rounds



raised in 2018) and a growing annual 15% during the last 20 years. This is data from Crunchbase, but from our own database, we know that Crunchbase didn't recognize at least 20% of investors and their deals didn't count in this market volume estimation. Which is a huge piece for potential growth. This is an important finding in the understanding of the market we made because calculations we get based on our database deals and estimates the total VC market at near \$ 500B.

Potential Available Market (PAM) - \$12B total spent on fundraising (consultants, IB, lowers, travels, services, etc) by startups. Share of PAM in the overall VC market will grow even more as the VC market becomes more complex and geographically more widespread.

Total Addressable Market (TAM) - \$4B total spent for LinkedIn, Crunchbase, Pipedrive, investors and advisers bases and other products to support fundraising now.

Serviceable Available Market (SAM) - \$1B. Calculated as up to 20% of all startups in the fundraising process can spend up to \$1000 per annum for our products.

Serviceable and obtainable Market (SOM) - \$200M

As we see from these calculations Unicorn Nest focused on a potentially big market with a few strong competitors. So, obtaining even a small share of this market can be a good business objective. This market becomes even more attractive when we look at the growth of this market in the next few years.

1.4 Market Growth

Crunchbase data show that the total venture capital market is growing 15% annually. But the growth of TAM SAM SOM wouldn't be linear. With every new startup coming to market, the deal flow of top funds becomes more flooded, while new funds often cut from the global deal flow and actively search for startups. With growing numbers of startups and funds, inefficiency in distribution would grow rapidly, making the fundraising process more and more complex. That leads to increasing demand for tools and services that can help funders deal with this inefficiency. So we assume the annual growth of SOM would be much more than 15% annually.

	1997	2007	2019	1997-2019
# of VC funds	220	700	39,000	x177
# of new startups per year	15,000	98,000	170,000	x11
# of startups	80,000	400,000	1,000,000	x13
# of deals per year	1,400	4,200	33,000	x24
Volume of deals per year, \$M	9,600	35,000	295,000	x31
Share of Silicon Valley funds, %	95	85	18	


Figure 5 - VC Funds and startups market

These numbers give an estimation of the potential market for our product and understanding of the scale we can achieve. These numbers were used in our further calculations when estimating possible sales and all other financial projections.

1.5 Cross board deals

One more factor that makes us believe that the potential market is going to grow rapidly is a share of cross board deals. We did research based on our data of 180K deals from 2000 to 2019 and found that the share of deals where investors and founders from different countries were involved was constantly growing.

It's obvious that startups from Bay area can easily find investors because of their high concentration there, but founders in other areas could be more interested in tools that make easier their fundraising process.



1.6 Competitors analysis

The deep competitor research for "Unicorn Nest" were provided and more than 50 different market contestants were collected. We segment it depending on the size of the database, quality of data (updates, number of fields, verifying, etc.), market focus, SEO, features, price e t c. More in Appendix 3.

Ignoring competitors causes startup failures in 19% of cases.


After that, among them, we have selected the most relevant for deeper analysis. Number one is Crunchbase. It is important to highlight the fact that they launch the "Advanced Search" feature a few days before our launch. That is both helps to validate the accuracy of our ideas and a little bit tighter competition. The second-largest competitor is Linked. It doesn't have a special product for equity search but in addition Crunchbase is commonly used to find contacts of persons in funds. The next group of competitors is Signal, Pitchbook, Dealroom, Mattermark. They have good databases but mostly focused on the enterprise segment in product development and in marketing/sales.

Priority	Name	Strength	Weakness
1	Crunchbase	Numbers, SEO, Industry standart	Bad structure, incompleteness, unverified, focused on companies, not people
2	Linkedin	Completeness, SEO, verified	Impossible to build list, focused on people not for companies

3	Pitchbook	Completeness, sales	Focused on enterprise in database Focused on enterprise in sale
4	Dealroom	Completeness, sales	Focused on enterprise in database Focused on enterprise in sale

Figure 6- Main competitors

Competitors segmentation



As it can be observed, “Unicorn Nest” has a lot of competitors, but only part of them have a current focus directly on our target market. To understand the competitive landscape we also made an in-depth analysis of all competitors on the market which you can see in Appendix 3.

Most competitors can be divided into a few groups. The first group with CB-insights, deal room, pitchbook building an analytical platform for enterprise clients mostly focused on investors' perspective of the venture deals. Another group is signal, foundersuite, and is focused on startups and problems of matching funds and startups.

CHAPTER 2: BUSINESS MODEL

2.1 Business model canvas

It is clear from the research that was done during several LvBS courses that well-articulated plan and segmentation work areas provide an incredible advantage over those who neglect this. This research paper is not an exception, where the Business Model Canvas developed by Alexander Osterwalder is used.

Business Model Canvas helped to tailor the business model of “Unicorn Nest”, determined which parameters should become a priority, found critical zones, and moved on to testing and improvement of plan. It was assumed that these approaches will be influential in high competitiveness and the rapid growth of business.

Table 2 - Business model canvas

Key partners <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Data providers - VC funds - Startup incubators - Universities - Startup community 	Key Activities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - R&D - Marketing - Sales 	Value Propositions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Finding relevant investors and their contacts - Saves 150 hours of funders in fundraising process 	Customer relationships <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Become industry standard for fundraising - Pay as you go service for startups 	Customer Segments <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Startups on seed or A round. - Startups during pivot (researching new markets) - VC funds (both for research and for their portfolio companies)
	Key resources <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Data - Team 		Channels <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Search engines - Incubators, funds, edu. - Events 	
Cost Structure <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Data analysts 		Revenue Streams <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Pay as you go for startups 		

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Customer acquisition - Support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Annual subscription for VC's funds
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Value Propositions

In Unicorn Nest our main value proposition is built around the idea of improving the fundraising process. The proposition is saving time of a founder on the research of different funds and finding actual emails of its partners. Also, the service improves startup chances of finding a relevant investor and getting in their inbox, which leads to increased chances of closing the fundraising round. The main pain-point we eliminate for our customers is that the fundraising process is exhausting and shift focus from product development.

Customer relationships

We plan to become an industry standard for startups seeking investment. Like Crunchbase now is a mainstream source of data for founders and LinkedIn is a standard for networking in the venture capital community. While we expect the rapid growth of the complexity of relationships on a venture capital market, we want to become a useful tool for every entrepreneur.

Customer Segments

There are two main customer segments – startups and venture funds, but actually, there are a lot of possible customer personas. In a startups segment, we define experienced startup founders that already understand the fundraising process and for them, the main value we deliver is time-saving. For the inexperienced startup founders, on the other hand, the main advantage is the easy way to get the relevant investors list. For founders from areas with the developed startup ecosystem, the product is more like an addition to their basic investor's list, but for customers from countries with a less developed ecosystem, the product is also a chance to find investors from other countries.

Channels

As we focused on a broad market of early-stage startups with very low prices for our service we can't rely on personal sales, so we need to focus on more scalable channels. From competitor analysis, we know that the biggest channel for us would be search traffic and we have the most important resource for that - data. But also we understand that building industry-standard solutions requires deep integration with the startup community so we planned activities with funds, startup incubators, universities, other educational institutions, conferences, etc.

Key partners

As it was mentioned before, we planned activities with funds, startup incubators, universities, other educational institutions, conferences. Also, we have few data suppliers that help us collect and verify data. And we have the support of a few government institutions that help to build our company with grants, consultancy, and various other startup support programs, mostly in Luxemburg.

Key Activities

The main objective is to build a product and the most important part of our product is Data. So, our main activity is data collection and verification. On the other hand, to make our product great like never before, we need to make our algorithms of scoring and search work with the best performance on the market. Both data mining and algorithms development are called R&D in Unicorn Nest.

The second crucial activity is marketing. The business model would work only if we get serious customers' attention, grow our user base rapidly, and get a share of the market in the next few years.

Key resources

It is widely popular to assume that data is a new oil. A key resource for this business is data of startup deals and everything around. Part of the data we collect by ourselves, part of the data is collected automatically and then validated by our employee, part of the data we get from data providers.

Another important resource is a team of data-scientists that understands the venture capital market and can work with our datasets.

Cost Structure

Unicorn Nest is a value-driven company and our focus is to deliver more value, that's why right now almost 70% of the cost is the salary of data scientists, developers, and other team members. For this phase it's normal because we mostly focused on product development. But in future Customer acquisition campaigns will change cost structure towards more marketing-focused because of our expansion plans. The cost of support for our product will be relatively low.

Revenue Streams

From the customer's interviews, it is known that they are ready to pay nearly \$150 for our service. It was decided to use the pay-as-you-go model and ask for some amount of money after we show the user cut version of the dataset we generate for them. While it was not sure of the exact amount users would be ready to pay in real life, a series of experiments with different prices was planned to measure price elasticity and understand the optimal price for our product.

Also, the high LTV was not expected from our customers because of the nature of the problem we were solving but from the first test, it was clear that some customers made more than one purchase, so this part needs further research.

2.2 Business model validation

Usual startup flow for business model validation is making an assumption, run test, evaluate assumption. Startups lose when they do not solve market problems. The key is to discover a big problem that could be resolved with the help of the product, and, of course, was based on a reliable business model.

If you have direct competitors you can use their selling model and price as a benchmark. In our case, the closest competitor is Crunchbase that sells its service for \$29 monthly. Our focus and our product didn't fit well in the classical saas model so we came up with the assumption that we should sell with pay per every search. After the customer interviews, we find out that they willingly pay 50-150\$ for their startup investors' database. In the classical saas business model, there are two most important indicators CAC and LTV. CAC can be tested with a quick and cheap marketing campaign. But estimating LTV is much more complicated because it is usually based on churn rate or retention rate that cannot be tested quickly. For example, if you expect churn rate to be 5% yearly you would only be able to check it in nearly a year, and every 1% drop in this number could affect cash flow estimation dramatically.

Also, it was clear that on the initial stage of market expansion it's logical to start with lower prices to get more clients, more market share, and some network effect.

So, one of the first problems that was brought to attention in Unicorn nest was pricing. Because Unicorn nest is a company that is selling data, it was decided that a data-driven approach for this problem will be used.

A series of test marketing campaigns with a different price to understand price elasticity was designed. Understanding CAC and LTV for every price option gets our data to estimate scenarios where we start with a smaller price and then raise it gradually.

This approach significantly changes initial business model estimations so it was decided to proceed and go deeper with data we get after tests.




Figure 8 - Impact of Acquisition and Monetization

2.3 Taxonomy and elasticity analysis

In the first estimations, product price 100\$ was used, from customer interviews it was known that they are ready to pay even more but for initial campaigns, it was decided to start with a \$30 price to get first customers quickly and test our product.

But there was a need to reflect this in the business model. We started with a \$30 price, estimated Customer acquisition cost (CAC), and suggested that every client makes 1.1 payment every year. The classical SaaS indicators like churn rate was not used because our product didn't have a subscription and recurring payments, so it was suggested that the Lifetime Value (LTV) would be $1.1 * \text{price}$.

	Assumptions
Product price	30
CAC	25
sales/client	1.1
LTV	33
sales 1 year	6000
revenue 1 year	198000
cos of sales	150000
gross profit	48000

Figure 9 - First model assumptions

Increasing your customer lifetime value (LTV) and decreasing your customer acquisition costs (CAC) is fundamental to achieving high growth. But pricing can have more impact on results than LTV and CAC.

So, it was decided to run a test with a different price to understand price elasticity and update our model with an optimal pricing strategy. The results from our first test with different prices and CAC were received and it was important to get a more complex model to reflect all this data.

	Assumptions	test1	test2	test3
Product price	30	30	35	40
CAC	25	25	27	27
sales/client	1.1	1.05	1.05	1.05
LTV	33	31.5	36.75	42
sales 1 year	6000	6000	6000	6000
revenue 1 year	198000	189000	220500	252000
cos of sales	150000	150000	162000	162000
gross profit	48000	39000	58500	90000

Figure 10 - First test result for acquisition campaigns with different prices of product.

Price elasticity

The tests were in action and the first results were received. After that, the projections on how CAC and LTV would change if we change prices every year from now and make it 100\$ after 3 years were made. While scaling this number can change so, for now, a coefficient to reflect this was used. Also, it was planned to repeat this experiment campaign in the future to adjust these numbers and update our projections.

	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Price	30	50	70	100	100
expected LTV	32	57	86	121	121
expected CAC	27	31	39	44	44

Figure 11 - Price, CAC and LTV expected levels based on elasticity analysis

LTV elasticity

Also, the elasticity analysis for LTV was done, changing LTV/CAC from 1.1 as base level up we define red and green zones. The model shows better results only in scenarios where LTV/CAC is more than 2, which is closer to what classical SaaS companies have but to achieve this we need to switch to monthly recurring payments and rebuild our product to a subscription model. This scenario is going against the perception of customer needs, but it was decided to left it on a table as an option.

The next thing to include in a model is a product readiness. It was assumed that the product was 30% ready. This value includes database fullness and consistency, search, UX/UI, ML scoring functions, ML in updating data. In the next few years with product development, it was planned to move this parameter up to 100%. It will affect LTV value and CAC that on the other hand will affect profit estimations but a way to calculate its impact and include this in a model wasn't found at this stage. So it concluded with the only option of running tests and measuring current LTV and CAC values.

LTV/CAC elasticity

There are a lot of cases of companies that changed LTV to CAC ratio dramatically. One of the most interesting is Hubspot – they could change LTV from 10 000\$ to 31 000\$ in 6 quarters with the same CAC. The biggest driver for this was lowering churn rate from 3,5% to 1,5%. This shows how even small changes in churn rate or in our case in LTV/CAC rate can lead to big changes in financial forecasts. That

uncertainty in forecasts can be mitigated by segmenting users, cohort analysis but there is not enough data at this moment.

2.4 Pivot decision

Every estimation was combined with profit and loss projections for the next five years. Resulting in optimizing NPV and cash flow estimations. Next was an elasticity analysis based on different discount rates. This analysis showed that the current strategy is not strong enough.

With current LTV and CAC, investment in the rapid growth of a client's base is not optimal. While it was not clear that the company is ready for market expansion, the model shows us that investment in retention and product development right now is more rewarding in future CF and company valuation. So the decision was made to postpone a massive campaign and rebuild our strategy with a less rapid growth plan.

So the next question was when to start market expansion.

We definitely should leave limited customer acquisition efforts to have active clients for live feedback on product development. Also now when it was decided to postpone massive marketing campaigns we can invest in search engine optimization and content marketing because both of these instruments have a long effect on sales and potentially can bring us, client, with lower CAC. But we need to connect it with our fundraising strategy and that means we need an accurate projection on how investment in these instruments would affect cash flow in the future.

So the scenarios with different investments in customer acquisition, retention, and product development were developed.

Scenario	year1	year2	year3	year4	year5
SEO 1	50000	50000	100000	100000	150000
SEO 2		50000	50000	100000	100000
SEO 3			50000	50000	100000
Content1	20000	30000	30000	30000	30000
Content2		20000	30000	30000	30000
Content3			20000	30000	30000

Retention 1	20000	30000	40000	50000	60000
Retention 2		20000	30000	40000	50000
Retention 3			20000	30000	40000

Figure 12- Different scenarios of investing in SEO, content marketing, retention.

Then the model was recalculated with all possible options including every scenario and different combinations of these scenarios. In each scenario, we get CF and possible company valuation projections and compare them. From this scenario comparison, we get data-driven and meaningful insights on the decision we made.

But it's not the end, in a changing environment a constant valuation of our strategy is needed. So to set control points was a priority where we would update our model with data from test campaigns and review our strategy accordingly.

It was planned to repeat test campaigns every half year and update our scenarios based on actual information to change our model accordingly.

CHAPTER 3: IMPACT

3.1 Product Development

One of the first goals was developing a product development strategy. From the Product development course in LvBS, the Competitive matrix framework was used.

In a product development process, the biggest risk is drowning in premature optimization, losing focus, and distraction from developing main features. The competitive matrix framework helped us to avoid these risks.

First, three competitors were chosen. Crunchbase, Foundersuite, Pitchbook because it represents products designed for different segments of customers. Segmentation on data completeness and focus described in the competitor analysis paragraph. Sophistication analysis was made and Crunchbase, Foundersuite, and Pitchbook were chosen because it represents industry standards and developing advanced solutions.

After that, client segments were chosen. From Mr. Selhorst's course, we know that the best way to define these segments is to refine personas by behavioral and situational context. A-series startup – already raised a seed round and interested in effectively raising a second round and may be interested in research during their pivot. Seed-series startup that is interested in the first round only. Enterprise mostly represented as fund or family offices that are interested in analytics for their operations and maybe in providing their portfolio companies with access to this instrument. We understand that we can't serve all customer segments equally well so we need to prioritize our efforts. The competitive matrix framework helps us determine the strengths and weaknesses of the competitive landscape for different customer segments.

Also, Bowman's strategy Clock to map the struggle between value and cost for every competitor was made. And the project team tried to predict their developing strategy.

Competitive Matrix Template													
How good each competitor is overall, from each customer's point of view	49	49	45									Us (full release)	
	44	45	42									Us (first release)	
	40	40	36					pitchbook		signal			
	50	54	54					Crunchbase					
	39	42	42										
Importance of each problem to each customer	pre seed	A+	Enterprise	Problems	Us (right now)	Now	Future	Now	Future	Now	Future		
	4	5	5	DB completeness	4	3	3	4	4	3	4	4	4
	5	4	3	contacts list	4	2	3	3	4	2	2	4	5
	4	3	2	crm	1	1	1	1	1	3	3	1	1
	2	3	4	non venture investors	1	4	4	4	5	1	1	2	2
Importance of customer to our strategy	5	2	4										
447	195	84	168	Crunchbase	(future)								
574	250	108	216	pitchbook	(future)								
424	200	80	144	signal	(future)								
478	220	90	168	Us	(near term)								
523	245	98	180	Us	(long term)								
Overall relative strengths of all competitors, given relative importance of each customer group as a function of our selected strategy													

After analyzing the competitive matrix we get a list of features structured based on Ted Levitt’s Total Product Model - “Table Stakes“, “Competitive Jockeying“, “Differentiation“, “Disruption“.

Competitive matrix framework was very useful not only to prioritize the development of product features but also to better understand consumers in different segments, their problems, and competitors' strategies.

Crunchable revamped

On April 23, the project received another letter from Crunchbase titled “We've Revamped Crunchbase”. New features they revamped were totally in line with the project prediction of their strategy that were made after our inner Competitive matrix workshop.

Machine Learning

Also, in April, the proposal from Luxemburg authorities to grant us almost \$1M if we place the data scientist team there. It’s a part of the program of supporting

companies incorporated in Luxembourg. Opportunity to hire a top data scientist in Europe to work on our product kickstarts the plan to change most of our features that work on statistical models to AI-based models. Before this, we ran some tests to understand how machine learning can help to deliver better results, find hidden connections in data, and help to optimize time on manual data updating from various resources. But while statistical methods work well and are already working, switching to more machine learning wasn't our first priority. After receiving this proposal, a plan on features was developed that can be built or rebuilt using ML methods. So, this part of product development is scheduled until the end of 2021.

3.2 Multi product model

After competitor analysis, it is clear that a lot of competitors like Dealroom, Pitchbook, CB insights are focused on Enterprise clients and venture funds particularly. They are selling their service with annual/monthly subscription fees for dozens of thousands of dollars.

While it was decided to focus on startups with a much smaller average price, it was also in project`s scope to collect feedback from venture funds. It was expected they would recommend our service to their portfolio companies. After first interviews with funds, it was understandable why these competitors work there. Most funds were very interested in our data, they were ready to pay for access even if they already bought our competitor's data. Also, they were interested in using our service by their portfolio companies when they pivoted. Before this, we only saw one user-case (fundraising) for startups but now we see another user case – using our database for market research during startups pivots. That unexpected insight and huge interest from funds changed our view on our product development plan and we start considering making our own pivot and making two products based on our dataset.

Free trial agreements with three funds were signed, to collect their feedback. It stimulated other funds to make the offer as well.

With limited resources, one needs to be careful with decisions. Switching to two products with the different target audiences and totally different selling processes can lead us to lose focus on our primary market. But on the other hand, interest from funds was so huge, it was believed we could get traction there.

	UN for Startups	UN for Funds
Sales	online	sales managers
Model	pay as you go	annual subscription
TA	startups	Funds
Competitros	Crunchbase	Pitchbook, dealrom e t c

Figure 14- Two products comparison

This discussion inside our team takes place at the same time we get first campaign results and evaluate our model. This process is described in Taxonomy and elasticity analysis.

Decisive factors became insight that was received from another interview with the fund. It became clear that while selling our database to fund that lets their portfolio companies use it we also promote our product to our main target audience.

Because we already had a model that connects all our plans with estimations of sales we decided to use it here too. For our second product (Unicorn nest for funds) we suggest that our initial price would be \$1000 per year that is significantly lower than CB insights, dealroom, or pitchbook. Then we compare two scenarios with the second product and without. Scenario with two products needs more investment, our financial results for 20-21 years are less attractive, but next year's results were much better. Also, this strategy was in line with our plans to postpone massive acquisition campaigns for our primary product and our investors approved these changes, promising to support it with proper investment.

First feedback from the funds

While the signing of first agreements with funds and giving them access to our beta version very different feedback was received. Some funds and accelerators like “Wise guys” are extremely happy and their portfolio companies use our service extensively from the first day. But some other funds were inactive. Right now the plan is to develop some engagement efforts for them and their portfolio startups.

Future plans

Some competitors are launching additional features that can be a logical extension of our product. For example, the founder suite has already launched a CRM for managing investors leads, and Crunchbase announces plans to integrate their search lists with salesforce. So the CRM for investors was considered as a possible development option in future.

3.3 Marketing strategy

In the first stages, the main objective of the "Unicorn Nest" marketing team is acquiring new customers for feedback on a product and first tests of CAC. From previous market research, it was clear that CAC from search ads and Facebook ads are too high for our unit economy.

Performance campaigns

Forecast of performance campaigns gives us CAC from 80\$ to 150\$ that's doesn't work with the business model where the first payment was 30\$ and there was not enough information to make LTV projection that would be more than that.

Tools	Clicks	CPC, UAH	Conversion rate, %	Numbers of conversion	Cost of Conversion, UAH
Google Search	420,00	46,00	4,00%	17,00	1 136,47
Facebook	1 380	26,09	1,75%	24,00	1 500,00
Twitter	1 200	27,50	1,65%	20,00	1 650,00

Figure 15 - Initial CAC projections

So a small performance campaign to test real CAC. While the first result CAC was too high (more than 100\$) some spots where we could get cheaper conversions were found. With further optimization, we achieve CAC less than 50\$ average. But this optimization means that the customers will be cut off from most attractive regions like Silicon Valley, UK, and more importantly, we understand that we would have problems while scaling these campaigns. Low volume PPC-performance campaigns are still good and get us customers but for achieving our sales goals we need other instruments to include in our strategy.

Keywords	CPC \$, New York	CPC \$, California	CPC \$, England	CPC \$, France	CPC \$, Germany	CPC \$, UAE	CPC \$, Israel	CPC \$, Singapore	CPC \$, Australia	CPC \$, Japan	CPC \$, Netherlands
angel investors	2.51	2.56	2.43	2.13	2.32	1.3	2.23	1.61	2.95	1.21	2.51
business partner	2.01	1.89	2.02	1.68	1.7	1.01	1.88	1.22	1.98	2.19	1.76
funding project	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.2	-	-	-	3.66
funding sources	2.16	3.39	2.78	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
investment companies	2.15	2.16	2.6	1.77	1.76	2.18	1.84	1.83	2.48	1.5	2.35
investment funds	1.8	2	2.45	2.62	2.62	1.6	2.62	2.13	2.69	1.97	2.13
investor directory	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
private equity	2.61	2.52	2.46	2.04	2.63	1.61	2.45	2.23	2.25	2.08	2.39
private equity directory	1.59	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
private investors	2.87	2.64	1.73	2.51	1.47	1.51	0.79	2.77	2.08	-	2.79
raising capital	2.86	2.47	2.41	1.21	1	2.34	1.62	1.7	2.54	2.29	2.67
raising money	1.76	2.33	2.04	-	3.14	1.07	-	-	1.91	-	-
research funding	2.3	2.18	1.85	1.49	1.35	2.23	1.98	2.81	2.7	2.04	1.29
startup capital	2.08	2.14	1.93	3.21	1.8	2.22	2.05	2.91	2.6	1.54	2.83
venture capital cm	-	-	-	0.79	3.43	0.68	1.51	1.56	-	-	0.91
venture capital database	3.34	-	2.32	-	2.32	0.98	-	-	-	-	-
venture capital firms	2.43	2.43	2.93	1.91	2.84	2.04	1.88	1.98	2.86	2.88	3.13
venture capital fund management	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
venture capitalist	2.24	2.37	2.83	2.28	2.44	2.1	2.11	1.8	2.81	2.3	2.38
venture capitalists	1.73	1.97	1.03	1.5	2.23	-	2.86	1.35	2.38	-	1.79
Average cost-per-click, \$.	2.28	2.33	2.19	2.02	1.41	1.68	2.1	1.81	2.39	1.76	2.14

Figure 16 - CPC for the different countries

Retargeting

The customer buying process for different products can be different. Our product is definitely not a 1-click-buy. Consumers spend hours on research across the internet to find the service they want. In this process, they visit our site and competitor sites many times. A crucial part of the Customer journey is returning customers to our site with retargeting features. We set up tracking on-site and based on that information create audience segments for clients who visit our site but didn't try our search, for those who try our search but didn't pay, those who read articles e t c. Then we set up

ad campaigns to engage these potential customers. This campaign increased our initial conversion rate by almost 20% while total CAC increased only 8%.

SEO

In the business model, there is a small payment and this works only if there are enough clients to make this work. Getting a lot of clients without paying for clicks is tough and we decide to focus on acquiring clients from organic search traffic. While we research Search engine optimization efforts made by our competitors we find that there is a fit for us. The data is becoming a very important asset at this part of project implementation. Hundreds of a thousand search queries were created from combinations of funds, persons, deals, etc. Then we get information about positions of the main competitor and search volume for these queries from different databases (Serpstat, Ahrefs). Segment it by geography, client type, verticals, etc. It was found that in SEO the main competitor is Crunchbase is in first place in nearly 15% of these search queries. But there is no strong second place. It became obvious that first place in SERP gets 32% of clicks while second 25%. While we can not compete with Crunchbase in most search queries, we definitely can fight for second place.





Figure 17 - Why SEO takes so long

While developing our SEO strategy the first problem was confronted. For better results in Google, to post more information about every fund, person, etc was essential. But on the other hand, it makes it easy for our competitors to copy our data that is the main asset for us. So we prioritize and post information only on items we are sure we get traffic.

The massive research on different types of possible search queries was made, generated hundreds of thousands of search terms with an estimation of potential traffic and competitors' strength for every query. From that database, the semantic core for our further work in SEO was made by choosing only search terms that can bring us traffic and have less competition.

Then it was clear that the next step is to gradually add pages to the site and make google index it. Right now more than 60K pages are added and more than 17K of them

are already on the Google index. Organic traffic from Google starts growing and we



expect more than 20K visits from google organic search per month at the end of this year and more than 100K visits/month till the end of 2021. With the current conversion level, it can give us more than 2000 sales this year and more than 8000 next year.

Retention

After the customer acquisition efforts were planned, the work on another part of the equation was started. Lifetime value. Our customers were segmented on “seed rounds”, “a+ rounds”, “funds, and their portfolio companies”. For funds and their portfolio companies, it was decided to make a separate product as described in the product development chapter. For “seed” and “A+” segments it was decided to plan email marketing campaigns and content marketing plans to try to engage them to buy our service for next rounds of funding, for some pivot research. It's hard to estimate the effect of this effort on sales because the buying cycle is long and the team just started these plans, but potentially it will increase our LTV.

3.4 Connection with Finances

When starting the work on a Unicorn Nest project, it became clear that current financial documents were mostly focused on reflecting the current situation and projections made during the fundraising stage are outdated. At the current stage, most expenses were salaries of data-scientists and developers and there was no profit from selling to clients.

But when customer acquisition started, the p & l needed to be updated to reflect these efforts and make accurate projections. To build the new model the focus was on two main aspects. First is income forecasting based on sales and average payment from our marketing plan. Second is expenses related to customer acquisition efforts.

Customer acquisition expenses have both fixed parts, for example, salaries of the search engine optimization team and variable expenses that are mostly related to CAC in performance marketing campaigns.

From a course of Financial Decision Making in LvBS, the driver-based model of financial planning was used in addition to its development in the marketing plans. So a model based on customer acquisition cost and lifetime value projections was built. But we also have to model our expenses based on the same logic.

Their new metric was tried out - Average cost of service (ACS) – that is made from the following components: Technical support cost, account management, data center costs, r&d capitalization, and maintenance of current product releases.

In the process of budgeting our customer acquisition, the interesting bias of outsourcing part of work related to SEO and performance campaigns management versus hiring some professionals were observed. Before this, some companies made these decisions from the agency perspective, but now it was a chance to look at it from a different angle. When comparing two scenarios with more outsourcing and more hiring in the long term it comes to the conclusion why part of the agency's clients choose an inhouse option.

WACC and LTV/CAC rate

The main impact on the model and the understanding of financial planning was made by DCF and its connection to the LTV/CAC ratio. As it was mentioned before, even slightest changes in LTV/CAC ratio could lead to changes in overall company results. But if one can cheaply raise needed capital you can be profitable with a lower LTV/CAC ratio.

Two products model

As it was decided to run two products simultaneously, we understand that we need to use two different models to forecast sales while cost is shared between them.

	1	2	3	4	5
Revenue UN4F	182000	415000	690000	455000	819000
Revenue UN4S	198000	1630000	3675000	5880000	10500000
CAC	150000	210000	600000	1660000	4200000
Average cost of service	7920	65200	183750	294000	525000
Cost of revenue	157920	275200	783750	1954000	4725000
Gross Profit	222080	1769800	3581250	4381000	6594000
Operating expenses	928673	1133882	1917030	2334012	3321680
EBIT	-706593	635918	1664220	2046988	3272320

Figure 19 - P&L for 5 years

3.5 Project roadmap

		2017				2018				2019				2020				2021				2022			
		1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q
Product	UN Consulting																								
	UN for Startups																								
	UN for Enterprises																								
	UN Analytic																								
	UN CRM for startups																								
	UN Marketplace																								
Fundraising	Seed \$250k																								
	Seed \$500k																								
	Series A, \$5M																								
	Series B, \$15m																								
Milestones	Alfa																								
	Beta																								
	Soft launch																								
	\$5k Revenue																								
	Academic Research																								
	Public Databases																								
	Database prototype																								
	Database forming																								
	Database forcing																								
	Database maintainance																								

Figure 20 - First roadmap

First lunch

February 20 the first version of our website with a beta of our "Unicorn Nest" for Startups product was launched. Since then the site has been visited by more than 40+ thousands of users, who made more than 50K searches. More than 200 of them purchase a dataset for their search. Also, more than 100 of them request free access to the dataset, because of this option available for users from Ukraine and Luxemburg.

Product hunt

April 23 our campaign on Product hunt was launched. This is a perfect instrument to attract first adopters and get feedback. It is of general knowledge that for product hunting better works free or freemium services, so it was decided to share some elements of the dataset with the startup community for free. The document consists of two sheets. One sheet provides information about funds, where you can learn which

funds invested before, after, or together with your selected fund, see the rankings based on the number of unicorns, exits, average round sizes, sort funds by country. Another sheet gives details about key persons at each of the funds. We get 1200+ upvotes on product hunt, 60+ reviews, 6000+ visitors from product hunt, few thousands of downloads of the dataset, and publications on sites like Ycombinator news.




Figure 21 - UN on Product Hunt

Considering these results as a success we also planned a few more activities on Product Hunt with launching free but useful startup community tools based on the data that can bring us more audience and more publicity.

Dataset

A most important part of the "Unicorn Nest" work is definitely the product itself. And while data was sold, it's quality and completeness was crucial for success. So the

biggest challenge is to become a leader in data quality. To compare, Pitchbook had data on 50K+ venture funds. Right now we have 38K verified funds in our dataset but we have information on nearly 75K funds that need verification and systematization and we plan to double the data amount till the end of 2020.

	Now	End of 2020
Cells with data	7,5M	15M
# of funds	38K	75K
# of DM	43K	270K
# deals	120K	170K
# of startups	46K	100K

Figure 22 - Dataset improvement roadmap

Sales Plans

After all the changes, we also updated our sales plans. Unicorn Nest for startups now plans to acquire 3000 new paying customers and up to 500 free users (Ukrainian and Luxembourg startups) till the end of 2020, now it's 20% done.

Unicorn nest for funds plans to sign up to 50 trial agreements with funds till the end of 2020 and now its 12% done.

Fundraising

All plans that were made in Unicorn Nest needed strong investor support. Our decision to develop a second product for VC's and to postpone acquisition campaigns leads to changes in our financial projections.

For the last half a year Unicorn Nest raised 250K as venture investment and 150K as grunts. While the COVID-19 outbreak slows down some legal agreements we still plan to rise 750K more this year as an investment and 850K more as grunts. Also, the \$50K grant from a Ukrainian startup fund was acquired.

COVID-19

Key value Unicorn Nest brings to its customers – making the fundraising process precise, effective and smooth by selecting best-matching investors for a specific start-up. In time of COVID-19 crises, it is estimated that most of the Europe-based start-ups have less than a year's cash left, which makes fundraising essential and critical for start-ups, its previous investors, employees, and partners.

According to Plug&Play survey, in almost 80% of cases COVID-19 crises slowed fundraising timeline while majority of founders are postponing fundraising even though no one knows for how long covid's negative impact will last. At the same moment, a 500 Start-ups poll shows that some 53% of investors will continue to invest in the same stages as planned prior to Covid-19. So, the key challenge Unicorn Nest solves is to match those in need of financing with those who will continue to invest even in times of crisis.

So, on top of the already launched UN for Start-ups product, we plan to develop and launch a sumproduct – Unicorn Nest Crisis edition, which will specifically target start-ups fundraising in time of crisis. Key Benefit: UN Crisis edition will match start-ups looking to raise funds with investment funds that are still active during the crisis. Flexible algorithms and solution architecture together with innovative methods of collecting data allow us to study past crises and fine-tune our product. Moreover, developed methodology will be dynamic, allowing start-ups to use it in various crisis-like scenarios.

UN Crisis edition with its scoring methodology and analysis tools will not only directly tackle Covid-19 crisis, but will be available to have a lasting impact on any other crisis times – including global financial crises, or regional/geographical-based events, or even industry-specific downfalls.

MANAGERIAL CONCLUSIONS

The venture capital market is growing fast and its growing complexity drives the market of solutions for startup founders and funds. Many companies see this opportunity but very few deliver reliable products and find product-market fit.

Finding the right product-market fit is a continuous process that includes testing, feasibility analysis, and pivots. This process should be based on frameworks, tools and decisions must be based on data. It's crucial to change initial plans quickly, update the model, and develop different scenarios.

While in the past half a year Unicorn Nest dramatically changed its product, marketing strategy, and financial projections it's still a promising startup with good consumer feedback and investors' support.

For the success of the startup, you should find a balance between long term goals like product development, short-time goals like quick sales to show investors traction and fundraising strategy. But accurate data-driven decisions are appreciated by investors and help support even rapidly changed strategies.

The main risks I see for this project are a failure to design the right value proposition and possible actions of biggest competitors that are not focused on a startup market right now but have a good database and more resources.

Personal conclusions

Working inside Unicorn Nest gives me a totally different perception of how startups work but more importantly it changed my view on the skills you should have to found a technological startup. Some skills I get from LvBS but some skills I need to work on my own. My experience in marketing sometimes interferes with my view of different important questions, so I need to develop a wide view.

IMPACT OF MSTM PROGRAM

The impact of the MSTM program on my entrepreneurial approach is significant. I might say that my life was divided into before and after. The Technology Management program structured and enriched my attitude to business administration at a fundamental level.

The Technological Entrepreneurship module which was introduced by Denis Dovgopoly became the starting point for this research paper. He brought me a deep understanding of how startups work and immersed the whole picture of the fundraising process step by step. That's why I wanted to base my research paper on his startup "UnicorNest" to introduce and confirm these initial findings and immediately implement all ideas in practice.

The other module importance of which I should emphasize is the Corporate Finance and Financial Decision Making module. It has turned my view on the strategic vision of those financial methods that I knew and used before in the business process of my company. It completely reversed the approach and order of calculations. The introduction to the cost and value of the company, and how NPV works significantly changed my understanding of finances. Also I found This is why I've immediately adapted these pieces of knowledge and treated my finances completely differently just after the module. Also, I used it while working on "Unicorn nest", it helps me connect all marketing KPI to finances and see the wider picture.

Scott Sehlhorst and his The Product Management module, at last, deal me with Competitive Matrix. I clarified the perception of the competitive landscape for different segments of clients. But what's more important, I understood how to weigh out which kind of feature to develop in the first place and how to set priority on them.

The Emerging Technologies module by Stephen Russo increased my understanding of the innovations potential and the stage of its life with the Hype Cycle.

In the end, I want to highlight the most useful and mind-blowing module Strategic Marketing Challenges with Joe Pons. The valuable contribution of this module cannot be overemphasized. While we explored real cases and practical dilemmas I changed the perception of marketing issues and gained a chance to see that elegant multi-level

solution to complex problems. Joe provides a completely new outlook not just on some indicators, but to the connection between them.

Appendix 1

	Link	Amount raised	Incorporated	Archive.org	Founding date	Pages
Crunchbase	https://www.crunchbase.com/	26500000	US	22000	2007	7220000
Angel.co	https://angel.co/	26200000	US	2184	2010	2030000
fundersclub.com	https://fundersclub.com/	6700007	US	788	2012	
Pitchbook	https://pitchbook.com/	13800000	US	1924	2007	
Signal	https://signal.nfx.com/	-	US	-	2015	
Equiteasy	https://equiteasy.com/		France		2016	
Rus Base	https://rb.ru/investor/	400000	Russia	31000	2012	113000
Dealroom.co	https://dealroom.co/	3200000	UK	103	2013	155000
Dux Soup	https://www.dux-soup.com/	-	US	0	2017	118
Mattermark	https://mattermark.com/	17200000	US	40	2012	1930
Founder Suite	https://foundersuite.com/	-	US	33	2015	41
Angel Match	https://www.angelmatch.io/			-	2018	7
Investor Scout	https://investorscout.co/			-	2019	8
The Funded	http://thefunded.com/	-	South Korea	50	2007	16 600
Angel Investor List	https://datastarta.com/	1000000	US	252	2016	46

Marquee Equity	https://www.marquee-equity.com/raise	-	US	14	2016	21
Capital Pilot	https://capitalpilot.com	81200	UK	29	2016	191
Investor Hunt	https://www.investorhunt.co/			-	2018	6
Investor List	https://investorlist.co/			24	2016	2
Syntiq	https://syntiq.com/		US	-	2015	55
VC Directory	http://vc-directory.com/		UK	59	2003	1670
Investor Intelligence	https://www.investorintelligence.io	-	US	-	2019	45

	Similarweb	direct	referral	Search	Social	Similarweb	search traffic	Product hunt	# of funds	CRM
Crunchbase	3 221	22	2	73	1	7500000	5475000	non	35000	non
Angel.co	7527	46	9	35	2	6500000	2275000	non	no data	non
fundersclub.com	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	non		
Pitchbook	28408	41	1	55	1	1300000	715000	66	50000	
Signal		-	-	-	-	-		485		
Equiteasy	-	-	-	-	-	-		non		
Rus Base	34 770	33	3	53	8	2450000	1298500	non	697	non
Dealroom.co	365 832	63	2	27	4	56000	15120	non	no data	non
Dux Soup	527 601	49	2	43	3	68000	29240	non	no data	non
Mattermark	727 106	41	11	42	2	30000	12600	non	no data	non

Founder Suite	1 238 745	80	1	13	1	25000	3250	102	no data	yes
Angel Match	1 997 977	30	67	2	1	-	-	415	no data	non
Investor Scout	2 864 335	39	38	3	17	-	-	996	no data	non
The Funded	3 272 748	-	-	-	-	7000	-	non	1000	non
Angel Investor List	4 206 682	-	-	-	-	2000	-	1496	no data	non
Marquee Equity	4 980 930	81	0	7	0	4000	280	non	25000	non
Capital Pilot	5 320 599	43	14	27	0	5000	1350	300	no data	non
Investor Hunt	6 456 264	41	33	19	6	-	-	1195	no data	non
Investor List	13 747 706	11	40	47	0	-	-	1212	no data	non
Syntiq	19 011 973	-	-	-	-	500	-	non	0	non
VC Directory	29 397 183	-	-	-	-	100	-	non	no data	non
Investor Intelligence	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	885	no data	non

Appendix 2

	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Revenue UN4F	182000	415000	690000	455000	819000
Revenue UN4S	198000	1630000	3675000	5880000	10500000
Performance marketing	40000	90000	420000	1420000	3800000
SEO Content	110000	120000	180000	240000	400000
CAC	150000	210000	600000	1660000	4200000
Average cost of service	7920	65200	183750	294000	525000
LTV/CAC 4 UN4S	1.05	1.3	1.35	1.4	1.45
Cost of revenue	157920	275200	783750	1954000	4725000
Gross Profit	222080	1769800	3581250	4381000	6594000
Operating expances	928673	1133882	1917030	2334012	3321680
EBIT	-706593	635918	1664220	2046988	3272320
Tax	0	0	116025	1267378	2454598
Net Income	-706593	635918	1548195	779610	817722

Appendix 3

How good each competitor is overall, from each customer's point of view		65	68	72									Us	
		61	65	69									Us	
		39	50	55							Dealroom			
		55	66	69					pitchbook		No w	Fut ure		
		49	59	62			Crunchbase		Now	Futur e				
Importance of each problem to each customer		a series startup	b-c series startup	Enterprise	Problems	Us (right now)	No w	Futur e						
		3	4	5	DB comp	4	3	3	4	3	5	5	4	4
		4	3	3	contacts	2	2	3	3	4	2	2	2	3
		3	5	5	CRM	4	4	4	4	4	1	1	4	4
		2	4	4	Non VC	1	3	3	3	4	4	4	2	2
Importance of customer to our strategy		5	3	2										
546	245	177	124	Crunchbase	(future)									
611	275	198	138	pitchbook	(future)									
455	195	150	110	Dealroom	(future)									
638	305	195	138	Us	(near term)									
673	325	204	144	Us	(long term)									

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

In this section, please find references to some abbreviations or industry-specific terms used in this thesis to gain a better understanding of the work. The complete list of important terms includes:

1. CAC – Customer acquisition cost
2. LTV – LifeTime Value
3. WACC - Weighted Average Cost of Capital
4. SEO – Search Engine Optimization
5. NPV – Net Present Value
6. ACS – Average Cost of Service
7. MRR – Monthly Recurring Revenue
8. VC – Venture Capital

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